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Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide* 
VIKAS AGARWAL†, WEI JIANG‡, YUEHUA TANG§, and BAOZHONG YANG** 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge 
funds, where the quarter-end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments 
to the Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases.  Funds managing 
large risky portfolios with non-conventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. 
Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information-sensitive events 
or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings 
exhibit superior performance up to twelve months, and tend to take longer to build. Together 
the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant 
motives for confidentiality.  
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Mandatory disclosure of holdings in public companies by investors is an essential part of the securities 
market regulation.  At the core of this regulation is the Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 that requires institutional investment managers to disclose their quarterly portfolio holdings. The 
quarterly reports, filed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the Form 13F, disseminate 
the public information about holdings and investment activities of institutional investors.  The 13(f) rule, 
however, allows the Commission the discretion to delay disclosure that is “necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.”  When filers request confidential treatment for 
certain holdings, they are allowed to omit those holdings off their Form 13F pending a decision by the 
SEC.  After a request is denied, or after the approved period of confidentiality expires, the filers must 
reveal those holdings by filing amendments to their original Form 13F.  Throughout the paper, we refer 
to these amendments as “confidential filings,” and the positions included in such filings as “confidential 
holdings.”  
Among all institutional investors, hedge fund management companies (henceforth, “hedge 
funds”) are most aggressive in seeking confidentiality, and are the focused sample of most of our 
analyses.  Constituting about 30% of all institutions, hedge funds account for 56% of all the confidential 
filings.  Conditional on confidential filing, hedge funds on average relegate about one-third of their total 
portfolio values into confidentiality, while the same figure is one-fifth for investment 
companies/advisors and one-tenth for banks and insurance companies. These stylized facts make hedge 
funds the ideal subjects to analyze the motives and consequences of confidential treatment.    
 Private information along with the associated price impact underlies the motives for 
confidentiality seeking.  It is in the best interest of investment managers not to disclose their informed 
positions before they have fully reaped the benefits of their private information (Huddart, Hughes, and 
Levine (2001)).  Timely disclosure of portfolio holdings may reveal information about proprietary 
investment strategies which outside investors can free-ride on without incurring the costs of research 
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themselves.  Hence some delay in disclosure is desirable for the preservation of incentives to collect and 
process information, which contributes to the informational efficiency of financial markets (Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980)).  As a matter of fact, several hedge funds and successful investors including Warren 
Buffett and Philip Goldstein have appealed to the SEC for an exemption from revealing their positions 
in the 13F forms.1  Moreover, it also has to be the case that the institutions intend to take advantage of 
the private information beyond the normal delay of 45 days to justify seeking confidentiality.   
Price impact concerns naturally interact with private information for two reasons.  First, in 
equilibrium, stocks that are more prone to informed trading should incur higher price impact (Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985)).  Second, when the disclosed holdings are informed, an increase 
in free-riding activity reduces the returns of the filing managers by causing security prices to move 
before the managers can fully implement their investment strategies.  Such a scenario is analyzed in 
Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven (2004), and Verbeek and Wang (2010).   
Price impact may also be unrelated to information.  Recent holdings information can allow 
outside speculators to anticipate further trades of the filers, whereas the speculators may trade ahead of 
the filers to capture the temporary price impact even if the filers’ trades are liquidity-driven.  Distressed 
sellers are particularly vulnerable to “predatory trading” (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005)). The fear 
of being front-run thus motivates filers to seek confidentiality till the desired transactions are complete.  
This motive can be exemplified by the “quant meltdown” in August 2007. Quant-oriented hedge funds, 
which employed similar strategies and attempted to cut their risks simultaneously in response to their 
losses, blamed mandatory holdings disclosure for contributing to a “death spiral” in the summer of 2007 
(Khandani and Lo (2007)).   
Finally, delaying disclosing positions through confidential filing could also serve as an 
alternative to “window dressing,” i.e., trading strategies meant to generate differences between the 
portfolios on the reporting date and those held at other times (Haugen and Lakonishok (1988), 
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Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991), Musto (1997, 1999), Ng and Wang (2004), and 
Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2012)).  Seeking confidentiality may incur lower cost to the filing managers 
than engaging in pre-disclosure trading if the main purpose is to hide certain positions from outside 
investors because these stocks are perceived as undesirable due to, for example, poor past performance 
or high risk.  
Using a complete sample of all original and amendments to 13F filings during the period of 
19992007, our study uncovers several pieces of empirical evidence that support private information as 
the predominant motive for confidentiality.  First, hedge funds with characteristics associated with more 
active portfolio management, such as those managing large and concentrated portfolios, and adopting 
non-standard investment strategies (i.e., higher idiosyncratic risk), are more likely to request 
confidentiality. Second, the confidential holdings are more likely to consist of stocks associated with 
information-sensitive events such as mergers and acquisitions, and stocks subject to greater information 
asymmetry, i.e., those with smaller market capitalization and fewer analysts following.  Third, 
confidential holdings of hedge funds exhibit significantly higher abnormal performance compared to 
their original holdings for different horizons ranging from 2 months to 12 months. For example, the 
difference over the 12-month horizon ranges from 5.2% to 7.5% on an annualized basis. 
To the extent that the private information and price impact hypotheses are inherently connected, 
our findings are indeed consistent with both.   Confidential treatment allows hedge funds to accumulate 
larger positions in stocks, and to spread the trades over a longer period of time; such a relief benefits 
both informed and liquidity-motivated trading.  Hedge funds trade about three times more in the 
confidential stocks compared to stocks included in their original holdings; they also take almost three 
times as long to complete the accumulation of the confidential stakes.  Such trades may well be 
motivated by information, as indicated by the superior performance of confidential holdings as a whole; 
nevertheless price impact is a necessary component in the consideration.  
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Lastly, confidential holdings consist of stocks that have performed relatively well recently, ruling 
out performance-based window dressing as a major motivation for filing confidentially. We do, 
however, find stocks in confidential holdings to have higher idiosyncratic volatility and total volatility, 
consistent with a risk-based window dressing motive (Musto (1997, 1999)) as well as an information 
motive because idiosyncratic volatility is also an established proxy for stock-specific information 
(Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003)). 
Given the perceived benefits of seeking confidentiality, it is necessary to discuss the associated 
costs.  Gaining confidential treatment is not meant to be a trivial task and is not guaranteed.2 The 
applying institution must provide a sufficient factual basis for the objection to public disclosure, 
including a detailed position-by-position description of the manager’s investment strategy (e.g., risk 
arbitrage), along with supporting analysis that public disclosure of the securities would reveal the 
investment strategy and harm the manager’s competitive position.  If denied (which usually takes two to 
twelve months during our sample period), the institution is obligated to file an amendment disclosing all 
the confidential positions immediately (within six business days).3    
Analyzing the SEC denial outcomes reveals that hedge funds incurring higher past denial rates 
and applying to seeking confidentiality for larger positions are more likely to be denied of confidential 
treatment.  We also find a significant positive market reaction, averaging around 1%, associated with the 
involuntary disclosure of positions due to denials within 180 days.  In contrast, there is no significant 
market reaction when hedge funds voluntarily disclosed their confidential filings that were not denied 
and that experienced the same length of delay. The contrast suggests that denials force revelation of 
information that has yet to be impounded into the stock prices, which may interfere with the filer’s plan 
to further accumulate position in the stock.  This puts a constraint on hedge funds’ seeking 
confidentiality without strict compliance to the rules, as denials impose costs on future applications.   
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Our study contributes to the literature in several ways.  Most specifically, our study provides new 
evidence on the stock-picking skill of hedge funds from the superior performance of their holdings that 
are likely to be motivated by private information.  Our paper adds to the literature that evaluates the 
performance and information content of institutional investors’ holdings (Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 
1993), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Chen, 
Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Wermers (2000, 2003), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008), 
Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007), and Huang and Kale (2009) on mutual funds; and Griffin and Xu 
(2009) and Aragon and Martin (2009) on hedge funds.)  By incorporating the confidential holdings and 
comparing them to the original holdings, our study provides a more complete picture of the stock-
picking ability of hedge funds.  Moreover, our research also calibrates the limitations of using the 
conventional institutional quarterly holdings databases that mostly exclude confidential holdings.  While 
any error due to the omission in evaluating the aggregate portfolio performance of all institutions is 
likely to be small, there can be a significant conditional bias in analyzing position changes of specific 
types of institutions and those around specific events (such as M&As.)   
More generally, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the effects of portfolio 
disclosure on money managers, including those on the investment decisions (Musto (1997, 1999)), 
performance evaluation (Kempf and Kreuzberg (2004)), strategic behavior (e.g., free riding and front 
running) by other market participants (Wermers (2001), Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven 
(2004), Verbeek and Wang (2010)), intra-quarter trading (Wang (2010)), and flow-performance relation 
(Ge and Zheng (2006)).  Our findings suggest that confidential treatment attenuates some of the tensions 
arising from holdings disclosure analyzed in these papers.  Our focus on hedge funds also helps settle 
the controversy regarding the value and effect of the “non-transparent” holdings in a lightly regulated 
sector and identify the key factors that influence the cross-sectional variation in the confidential filing 
activities.   
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Finally, our study contributes to the literature of mandatory ownership and holdings4 disclosure, 
which is less studied than that of issuer disclosure.  In the context of issuer disclosure, stricter 
requirements lead to more liquid and efficient capital markets which can reduce the disclosing parties’ 
cost of capital, but may also impose cost on them in losing competitive advantage or bargaining power 
due to the revelation of information to their competitors (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Fishman and 
Hagerty (1998, 2003), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)).  Analogously, the coexistence of mandatory 
ownership and holdings disclosure, and occasional relief through confidentiality weighs the benefits of 
market transparency of capital movements and investor monitoring of money managers against the costs 
of diluting the incentives to acquire information by active portfolio managers and of increasing their 
transaction costs.   
Changes in holdings can convey underlying fundamental information to the market—either 
because the change in positions reveals the filer’s private information about the value of the securities; 
or because the change in ownership represents potential shift in corporate control.  While disclosure 
enables investors to make informed assessment about how the investor structure of a particular firm may 
reflect or impact the value of the shares, some delay in revelation is necessary for such information to be 
generated and acquired in the first place.  This trade-off is analogous to the ones analyzed in the 
literature on insider trading disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty (1995), John and Narayanan (1997), 
Huddart, Hughes, and Brunnermeier (1999), Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001), and George and 
Hwang (2007)) and patent protection for firms to preserve their incentives to engage in R&D (Wright 
(1983)).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background information 
regarding the SEC ownership and holdings disclosure rules. Section II describes the construction and 
overview of the sample, and outlines the empirical motivation. Section III analyzes the determinants of 
confidential filings at the institution level and confidential holdings at the stock level.  Section IV 
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examines the abnormal returns of confidential holdings of hedge funds relative to those of their original 
holdings.  Section V models the determinants of denials of confidential filings and presents the event 
study of the market’s reaction to disclosure of denied confidential filings.  Finally, Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Institutional Background 
 The current ownership and holdings disclosure rules mandated by the SEC consist of five 
overlapping parts:  Schedule 13D for large (above 5%) active shareholders, Schedule 13G for large 
passive shareholders, Form 13F for general institutional holdings, Section 16 regarding ownership by 
insiders, and Form N-CSR and Form N-Q for quarterly or semi-annual disclosure of holdings required 
for mutual funds.   
 Among the five regimes, the Form 13F requirement under the Section 13(f) (passed by the 
Congress in 1975, and adopted by the SEC in 1978) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, covers by 
far the largest number of institutional investors:  all institutional investment managers (including foreign 
investors) that have investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities (mostly 
publicly traded equity; but also include convertible bonds and options) are required to disclose their 
quarter-end holdings in these securities.  We refer to the date when the Form 13F is filed with the SEC 
as the “filing date,” and the quarter-end date on which the portfolio is being disclosed as the “quarter-
end portfolio date.”  According to the SEC rule, the maximum lag between the two dates is 45 calendar 
days.  The same rule, however, allows the SEC the discretion to delay or prevent disclosure of certain 
holdings, usually up to one year (which can be extended further) from the date required for the original 
13F form. Such holdings will be disclosed in an amendment to the original Form 13F after a request is 
denied, or after the confidentiality period expires.  Figure 1 illustrates the time line of the original and 
confidential 13F filings. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
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The confidential treatment of some holdings as deemed appropriate by the SEC was justified on 
the grounds of protecting public interest, mainly of the investment managers and the investors whose 
assets are under management, because “disclosure of such strategy would impede competition and could 
cause increased volatility in the market place.”5  In 1998, the SEC staff issued interpretive guidance 
aimed at tightening the rules and restricting the conditions for confidentiality to prevent it from being 
used to mislead or manipulate the market.6 Our sample period (19992007) starts with the inauguration 
of the SEC’s electronic filing system, which also coincides with the new regime.  
The triggering event for the 1998 rule tightening was the confusion over the 13F reporting of 
investor Warren Buffett which caused a significant decline in the share price of Wells Fargo & Co. in 
August 1997.  The 13F form did not show Berkshire Hathaway’s well-known 8% stake in the bank, only 
because it was reported in a confidential filing. But the misunderstanding in the market caused Wells 
Fargo’s stock price to drop by 5.8% in one hour after Buffett’s 13F filing.7  A more recent event further 
illustrates the tension arising from confidential filing.  On August 14, 2007, D.E. Shaw & Company, one 
of the largest quant-oriented hedge fund managers, filed an entirely blank Form 13F for its second-
quarter portfolio.  That is, the fund manager was seeking from the SEC a confidential treatment of its 
entire portfolio, based on the argument that “copycat investors” were mimicking its strategies or could 
front-run on its large positions.  The SEC denied the request on October 19, 2007, forcing the firm to file 
an amended Form 13F on October 29, 2007, which covered 3,991 positions valued at $79 billion.  
Similar but less extreme requests from D. E. Shaw were rejected by the SEC before. 8  More recently, 
the confidential treatment received a new burst of attention in November 2011 when Berkshire 
Hathaway disclosed a bet of $10.7 billion on IBM, a position the fund accumulated in secrecy with the 
help of two quarters’ confidential treatment.9 
It is worth noting that the confidential treatment under Section 13(f) does not over-ride other 
SEC ownership or holdings disclosure rules.  For example, there is no confidential treatment for the 
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disclosure of a beneficial owner of more than 5% of a company’s equity under Schedule 13D or 13G. 
The same can be said about the holdings disclosure required for registered investment companies 
(mostly mutual funds), which was changed from a semi-annual to a quarterly basis (with a 60-day delay) 
in 2004.  Nevertheless, there are more than sporadic observations in our sample where the confidential 
positions would be required to file 13G (such as the Warren Buffett position in Wells Fargo) or quarterly 
holdings for a mutual fund management company (such as T. Rowe Price and American Funds).  In 
such cases, the confidential treatment may still afford an effective delay if the 13F disclosure is the most 
binding (e.g., Schedule 13G allows a 45-day delay from the year-end, and the disclosure requirement for 
mutual funds was semi-annual before 2004).   
Despite their potential importance, confidential holdings have not been systematically studied 
because they are generally not included in the conventional databases of institutional quarterly holdings, 
such as the Thomson Reuters Ownership Data (formerly the CDA/Spectrum database). 10   In a 
contemporaneous working paper, Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2011) also study hedge funds’ use of 
confidential filings.  In addition to having a more comprehensive sample of hedge funds, we conduct 
more analyses (such as characteristics of heavy users, trading behavior during confidential periods, as 
well as market reactions to the disclosure of confidential filings) to shed light on the costs and benefits 
associated with seeking confidentiality.  Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2011), on the other hand, link hedge 
funds’ confidential filings to their overall performance at the fund level. 
We verify that over 90% of the confidential holdings in our sample period are not covered by the 
Thomson Reuters Ownership Data.  The example of hedge fund, Stark Onshore Management LLC 
(manager number 10375 in Thomson Reuters), illustrates such omissions.  In Appendix A, we list all the 
confidential holdings of Stark Onshore Management during our sample period. We observe that, except 
for two stocks (Multi Fineline Electronix In., CUSIP = 62541B10 and Rouse Co., CUSIP = 77927310), 
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all the other 53 confidential holdings in the amendments are not included in the Thomson Reuters 
database. 
  
II. Sample Overview and Empirical Motivation 
A. Sample of Original and Amendments to 13F Filings 
A key data component to this study is the original 13F filings and amendments to these filings by 
all institutions. We retrieve directly both the original and amendment 13F filings (forms 13F-HR and 
13F-HR/A11) dated between March 1999 and June 2007 from the SEC’s EDGAR database.  Our sample 
starts with the inauguration of the SEC’s requirement of electronic filing of Form 13F, and ends in 2007 
to allow ex post performance evaluation.  We retrieve information about original filings directly from 
the SEC (rather than from Thomson Reuters), to maintain symmetry and comparability between the 
paired filings.  Despite the large variation in the reporting style and format, we are able to process the 
complete holdings information for 91% of all the 13F filings using a combination of automated 
programming and manual processing.  The resulting initial sample consists of 3,315 filing institutions, 
covering 86.1% of the institutions that report their original 13F filings to Thomson Reuters over the 
same period and 174 more institutions that do not appear in the database at all.  
Amendments to 13F filings contain two types of information: disclosure of a change in a position 
that was previously filed or a new holding that was previously excluded from the original filings. We 
define a confidential holding as one that was excluded from the original filing or the difference between 
the amended position and the originally filed position. Our results are qualitatively similar if we impose 
a threshold for the difference in the second component or simply exclude the second component.  Based 
on the main criteria, our initial sample consists of 1,857 confidential filings (including both the denied 
and non-denied cases) and 53,296 original 13F filings.  By searching for key words (such as "denied" 
and "no longer warranted") on the first page of the amendments, we are able to separate amendments 
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filed before or upon the expiration of confidential treatment and those filed in response to denials. Out of 
1,857 confidential filings, 17.4% are denied by SEC.   
Table I provides the summary statistics.  Panel A reports the distribution of length of delay 
between filings and the quarter-end portfolio dates.  Over 86% of original filings are filed within 45 days 
of the end of quarter, conforming to the requirement by the SEC.12  On the other hand, about 93% of 
confidential filings are filed more than 45 days from the quarter-end, justifying resorting to the 
amendments for delayed disclosure. Surprisingly, the distribution of the duration of confidentiality does 
not differ qualitatively between amendment filings that result from SEC rejections and the rest (not 
tabulated).  Such a lack of difference has two implications:  First, some institutions file amendments 
before the expiration of the confidential period, presumably because they have completed their strategy.  
Second, even denied applications effectively afford significant delays in disclosure.13 
[Insert Table I here.] 
In the analyses that follow, we exclude confidential holdings filed within 45 days of delay, as 
motives to conceal positions in these filings cannot be justified. We also filter out both types of filings 
with extremely long delays from their quarter-end portfolio dates: more than 180 days for the original 
filings and more than 1,505 days (four years plus the 45 days allowed for the original 13F filings) for the 
confidential filings. We suspect that these observations are results of data recording errors or irregular 
circumstances. These three filters combined remove about 1.3% of original filings and about 8.9% of 
confidential filings (see panel A of Table I).  Our results are not sensitive to the particular numerical 
choices we use in these filters.  
The resulting final sample consists of 52,272 original filings by 3,134 institutions, and 1,554 
confidential filings by 232 institutions. Panel B of Table I summarizes the number of filings, number of 
institutions, the dollar value, and the number of stocks in this final sample. In classifying the type of 
institutions, we refine the Thomson Reuters classification of five institution types with manual checking. 
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We describe the details of this classification in the Appendix B. Using this scheme, we classify 13F 
institutions as hedge funds, investment companies/advisors, banks and insurance companies, and others. 
Our refined classification scheme renders “others” into a small category (about 4% of the sample, from 
37% in the original Thomson Reuters classification) of miscellaneous types.  
Conditional on an institution filing both an original and an amended 13F at the end of a given 
quarter, the dollar value of the stock positions included in the confidential filings is significant: their 
average (median) value is 27.3% (13.4%) of the value of the complete portfolio of the institution. 
Moreover, confidential holdings tend to be larger positions than those in the original holdings.  The 
average confidential holding represents 1.25% of all the shares outstanding by the issuer, as compared to 
the average of 0.68% for the original holdings.   
Hedge funds, the focus of our analyses, are manually classified 13F-filing institutions whose 
major business is sponsoring/managing hedge funds according to the information revealed from a range 
of sources, including the institution’s own websites, SEC filings, industry directories and publications, 
and news article searches.14  A Form 13F is filed at the “management company” rather than at the 
“portfolio” or at the individual fund level.  For the purpose of our study, we restrict our sample to 
relatively “pure-play” hedge funds (such as Renaissance Technologies), and investment companies 
where hedge funds represent their core business (such as D.E. Shaw), and do not include full-service 
banks whose investment arms engage in hedge fund business  (such as Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management), nor do we include mutual fund management companies that enter the hedge fund 
business (a relatively recent trend analyzed by Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009), Cici, Gibson, and 
Moussawi (2010), and Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010)).  Such restriction ensures that the equity 
holdings in the 13F filings are informative about the investments of hedge funds (Griffin and Xu (2009), 
and Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2010)).  Our final sample consists of 942 unique hedge funds.   
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For robustness, we repeat our analyses by cross-validating our hedge fund classification against 
information from Form ADV by investment advisors to register with the SEC.  Specifically, we follow 
the prior literature (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009)) to affirm the 
classification of a hedge fund if (1) at least 50% of its clients are “other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., 
hedge funds)” or “high net worth individuals,” and (2) it charges performance-based fees.  This 
alternative filter produces a smaller list of 781 hedge funds.  However, from other reliable information 
sources, we find that the 161 institutions excluded by this filter indeed have major hedge fund business.  
In fact, the Form ADV-based filter excludes well-established hedge funds such as Appaloosa, AQR, 
Bridgewater, Citadel, Fortress, Magnetar, and Relational Capital to name just a few.  For this reason, we 
use this alternative list only for robustness check, and report the results in Table IA.I in the Internet 
Appendix.15   
Panel C of Table I lists the ten institutions that are the most frequent confidential filers during 
our sample period, and the ten institutions that receive the highest number of rejections from the SEC for 
their applications.  The majority of institutions on both lists are hedge funds, and the rest are investment 
companies/advisors. Berkshire Hathaway is on both lists.  D. E. Shaw and Caxton Corporation 
(currently renamed “Caxton Associates”), two of the top ten hedge fund companies in the U.S. as of 
2007, have been rejected by the SEC for 100% of their applications during our sample period.16   
Both panels B and C of Table I indicate that hedge funds are by far the leading category of 
confidential filers.  They constitute for about 30% of all institutions, but 56% of all confidential filings, 
and take majority seats among the top 10 filers. Conditional on seeking confidential treatment, hedge 
funds on average relegate 23% of the stocks in their complete portfolio, or 34% of the total portfolio 
value, to confidential filings.  In comparison, the same figures for non-hedge fund institutions are much 
smaller (13% and 21% for investment companies/advisors, and 9% and 11% for banks and insurance 
companies, respectively).  Such patterns are consistent with hedge funds being active portfolio managers 
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using proprietary trading strategies, for which delay in disclosure is important in order to protect private 
information and to minimize price impact.  Moreover, hedge funds (especially the “pure play” ones) 
tend to manage more concentrated portfolios, and are far less subject to other regulatory requirements 
for disclosure compared to other investment managers (such as mutual funds and pension funds).  As a 
result, confidential treatment under Section 13(f) provides more value of privacy to hedge funds.  For 
these reasons, we focus on hedge funds as the primary subjects for our study, while providing brief 
overview for the other two categories of institutions (investment companies/advisors, and banks and 
insurance companies).   
 
B.  Motivations for Empirical Analyses 
Building on the prevalence and distribution of confidential filings, we motivate our empirical 
studies of the incentives and consequences of seeking confidentiality from three strands of theoretical 
literature: that on mandatory disclosure, on informed trading, and on strategic trading by speculators.  
Some of the insights in the section also came up during our discussions with hedge fund managers and 
other industry sources. 
Private information is at the heart of the literature that studies the impact of mandatory disclosure 
on informed trading (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty (1995), John and Narayanan (1997), Huddart, Hughes, 
and Brunnermeier (1999), Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001), and George and Hwang (2007)).  Our 
setting is a mirror image of the standard one in this literature in that we analyze the benefits of seeking 
relief from mandatory disclosure.  Most relevant to our context is perhaps the work by Huddart, Hughes, 
and Levine (2001, henceforth “HHL”), which extends the Kyle (1985) model of an informed trader by 
introducing mandatory disclosure of trades at the end of each trading period.  HHL proves the existence 
of a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the informed trader adds a random noise to a linear strategy in 
each period in order to avoid full retrieval of the private information by the market maker. Such a 
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“dissimulation” strategy minimizes the loss in trading profits due to mandatory disclosure.  
We present a modified HHL model that better fits our context in part I of the Internet Appendix 
of this paper.17  The model predicts a positive relation between the benefits of confidentiality and 
information asymmetry.  The intuition is relatively straightforward.  Dissimulation in the HHL model is 
costly to the informed trader (relative to the no-disclosure benchmark) because some trades are made 
opposite to the direction of the private information.  The loss is positively related to the ex ante 
information advantage of the informed trader.  Relief from mandatory disclosure eliminates the need for 
dissimulation during the confidential periods, and hence restores some of the loss in trading profits 
which is positively related to information asymmetry.  
Assuming an exogenous cost of seeking confidentiality, the model thus suggests that the stocks 
in confidential holdings should exhibit higher information asymmetry or are more likely to be associated 
with information-sensitive events.  The same model also predicts that traders who possess more private 
information could benefit more from avoiding disclosure.  Hence, hedge funds that deploy more active 
and less conventional portfolio strategies should seek confidential treatment more often.  Our empirical 
study relates the likelihood of stocks being included in confidential holdings and that of hedge funds 
seeking confidentiality to proxies of information asymmetry and portfolio styles.  Sections III.A and 
III.B will discuss the empirical proxies for these characteristics and test their relation to confidentiality.  
Private information and price impact are inherently inseparable as motives for confidentiality 
because, as shown by the classical microstructure models (e.g., Kyle (1985)), potential private 
information as perceived by the market maker is the reason for price impact to submitted trades.  For 
this reason, confidentiality helps mitigating the price impact which may arise due to either trading by 
informed traders themselves or front-running by other traders.  Confidentiality not only allows the 
informed traders to spread their trading over a longer period of time under minimal dissimulation (as 
shown by our model in the Internet Appendix), it also protects them from being strategically traded 
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against (i.e., front-run) by others.  Less informed traders can benefit from the knowledge about more 
informed traders at the latter’s cost (Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Madrigal (1996)).  Such costs 
have been empirically shown to be substantial for the informed traders.  Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, 
and Shoven (2004) show that the after-fee returns of informed actively managed mutual funds could be 
rendered indistinguishable, or even lower than those of “copycat funds” who replicate their holdings as 
soon as the holdings are disclosed.  It is worth noting that uninformed (liquidity-driven) traders can also 
be vulnerable to the increased price impact due to front-running.  Most notably, speculators could 
engage in “predatory trading” to exploit traders in distress (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), 
Attari, Mello, and Ruckes (2005), Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007), and Pritsker (2009)).   
Given the normal 45-day delay allowed for regular 13F filings, confidential treatment is 
necessary only if the private information has not run its full course after the normal delay (the “long-
lived information” hypothesis), and that hedge funds need to build/dispose their confidential positions 
across multiple quarters (the “slow-building” hypothesis).  Prior research provides some evidence that 
information of positions by institutional investors is longer lasting than the quarterly frequency of 
mandatory disclosure.  Notably, Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) show that profits from mutual 
fund research tend to accrue over a period of 12 to 18 months after the new position is added to a fund's 
portfolio.  We verify the “long-lived information” premise (in Section V.B) with an event study that 
uncovers abnormal returns upon premature disclosure of confidential holdings due to an exogenous 
reason—quick denial by the SEC of hedge funds’ confidentiality application.  To test the “slow 
building” hypothesis, we examine (in Section III.C) whether hedge funds build their confidential 
positions more slowly and over more quarters than their positions disclosed at the end of the quarter.18  
What ultimately differentiates informed from liquidity-driven trading is the realized performance 
of the confidential holdings.  Section IV thus analyzes the abnormal returns of confidential holdings 
during the confidential periods.  If confidential treatment is sought for non-informational reasons, then 
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the realized performance of the confidential holdings should be close to neutral. Nevertheless, a neutral 
performance in this case does not refute the benefits of confidentiality because the counterfactual—
conducting large and sequential trades in the open air—may well lead to subpar performance. 
Lastly, we consider the portfolio-distortion motives behind confidentiality seeking in Sections 
III.B and IV.D.  Such a motive takes three basic forms, the main purpose of each of which is to present a 
portfolio to market participants that differs from the actual one.  The first is the “window dressing” 
motive, that is, hiding stocks that have characteristics that reflect negatively on the portfolio manager 
(i.e., poor past performance) or are perceived as undesirable by investors (i.e., high risk).  The second is 
the “portfolio blurring” hypothesis, that is, hiding part of the portfolio which makes it more difficult for 
outside speculators (including both copycats and front runners) to reverse-engineer the trading strategy. 
Finally, there can be nefarious motive of misleading the market and manipulating the prices by hiding 
stocks.  The filing institutions can potentially benefit from the temporary market reaction and eventual 
price reversion by placing side trades including using derivatives. Such behavior is illegal, and hence is 
usually difficult to detect in data. 
Though different motives are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can share common 
predictions, the presence of positive abnormal returns of confidential holdings supports hedge funds 
benefiting from private information with mitigated price impact.  Findings about performance should be 
viewed as a lower bound estimate for the abnormal return of information-driven confidential holdings if 
other portfolio-distortion motives are also present. 
 
III. Determinants of Confidential Filings and Holdings of Hedge Funds 
 By focusing on hedge funds, this section discusses the determinants of confidential filings at the 
institutional level (using institution-quarter data) and confidential holdings at the stock level (using 
institution-quarter-holding data). Unless otherwise specified, we adjust standard errors for 
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heteroskedasticity and cluster them at the filing institution level, as well as control for time fixed effects 
by including quarter dummies. 
 
A. Hedge Fund Characteristics and Propensity of Confidential Filings 
We resort to the following models to relate the characteristics of hedge funds to their propensity 
to use confidential filings.  The first is a probit model: 
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The dependent variable in (1), (CFj,q > 0), is the indicator variable for the existence of a confidential 
filing in the institution-quarter (j, q).  The dependent variable in (2) is the dollar value proportion of 
confidential holdings in the total portfolio (that includes both confidential holdings and holdings 
disclosed in the original 13F filings) of the given institution-quarter.  The regressors in both models 
include a vector of institutional characteristics variables (InstChar) and quarterly dummies to control for 
unspecified time effects.  
We report the results in Table II.  In addition to the coefficients and their associated t-statistics, 
we also report the average partial effects (APE) to facilitate the interpretation of the economic 
magnitude.  For the probit model, the APE is defined as: 
    , , ,Pr( 0) / .j q j q j q qAPE E CF InstChar E InstChar            (3) 
where  is the standard normal probability density function.  We construct the empirical analogue by 
replacing parameters with their estimates and using sample average to proxy for expectation.   
[Insert Table II here.] 




variable: *, ,/j q j qCF InstChar  , which is not usually of interest.  Instead, the more meaningful APE 
concerns the effect of the regressors on the actual choice of confidential holdings, that is,
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where     is the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution. The reported APE 
are the empirical analogues to (4). 
Table II uses a set of InstChar variables, which we construct mostly based on 13F quarterly 
holdings, to capture the degree of active portfolio management and the market impact of the institutions.  
More specifically, Age is the number of years since the institution’s first appearance on Thomson 
Reuters.  PortSize is the total equity portfolio size calculated as the market value of its quarter-end 
holdings.  Turnover is the inter-quarter portfolio turnover rate calculated as the lesser of purchases and 
sales divided by the average portfolio size of the last and the current quarter. 19   PortHHI is the 
Herfindahl index of the portfolio, calculated from the market value of each component stock.  PortRet, 
PortVol, and IdioVol are the monthly average return, total volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility of the 
portfolio during the quarter, assuming that the institution maintains the holdings of the last quarter-end.  
We compute IdioVol as the standard deviation of the residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model (market, size, book-to-market, and momentum) using imputed monthly returns for the 36-month 
period ending in the current quarter. We define |Flow| as the absolute change in total portfolio value 
between two consecutive quarters, net of the change due to returns, scaled by the portfolio size at the 
previous quarter-end.  That is, 
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Table II reveals that several characteristics are significantly associated with more frequent 
confidential filings.  First two are portfolio size (PortSize) and absolute flows (|Flow|), consistent with 
larger hedge funds that have higher inflows or outflows bearing higher market impact and also having 
potentially larger capacity in collecting private information.  An inter-quartile change in these two 
variables is associated with an increase in the probability of confidential filing by 2.7 and 0.3 percentage 
points.  Second, several characteristics associated with active portfolio management are uniformly 
associated with more confidential filings.  They include high portfolio turnover rate (Turnover), high 
portfolio concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index (PortHHI) (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2005)),  and high portfolio idiosyncratic return volatility (IdioVol).   The changes in the probability of 
confidential filing corresponding to the inter-quartile ranges of these three variables are 3.2, 0.9, and 0.7 
percentage points.  These numbers are economically significant relative to the unconditional probability 
of 3.4%.   
We argue that such a pattern is supportive of private information.  First, a recent paper by Titman 
and Tiu (2011) finds that better hedge funds (in terms of Sharpe ratios and information ratios) exhibit 
lower R-squared values with respect to systematic factors.  Second, a long-equity portfolio with high 
idiosyncratic risks, conditional on portfolio concentration, implies component stocks of high 
idiosyncratic variations.  Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) show that such stocks contain 
more firm-specific information.  Finally, this pattern echoes Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang’s (2010) finding 
that hedge funds which choose not to report to any commercial databases tend to have higher 
idiosyncratic volatility compared to the funds that report.  Both their findings and ours indicate that 
hedge funds who adopt less conventional investment strategies value privacy more—they are more 
likely to refrain from voluntary disclosures or to seek exemptions from mandatory ones.   
 An alternative way to characterize hedge funds is to look at their stated investment styles.  Such 
information is only publicly available for the funds that voluntarily report to commercial hedge fund 
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databases.  Based on the 450 sample hedge funds (as 13F filing institutions) that have matches in a 
union of five major hedge fund databases (Center for International Securities and Derivative Markets 
(CISDM), Eurekahedge, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 
Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services (TASS, now Lipper)),20 we find that the top styles associated 
with seeking confidentiality are: Event Driven, Multi-Strategy, and Relative Value Arbitrage.  Indeed 
these categories are likely candidates for “risk arbitrage” and “block positioning”, two major allowable 
reasons in the SEC guidelines for delay in disclosure. 
 
B. Characteristics of Confidential Holdings 
 We next examine the characteristics of stocks in confidential holdings and relate them to the 
various motives behind seeking confidentiality.   
 The event that best exemplifies sensitive information, and acknowledged by the SEC as 
acceptable motives for confidentiality, is an “open risk arbitrage,” which involves a long position in the 
target stock (possibly paired with a short position in the acquirer’s stock if a stock deal) right after the 
deal is announced.  The position is expected to be reversed when the deal is closed, and the profits come 
from the price convergence to the offer.   We use the indicator variable (M&A) for a stock of the target 
in an announced (but not completed) M&A deal during the one-year period ending in the portfolio 
quarter as a proxy for the merger arbitrage motive of the confidential filing.  About 86% of the 
announced deals in our sample are eventually completed. We retrieve the data on M&A attempts, 
defined as an intended change-of-control, from Securities Data Company (SDC).21 Our final sample has 
4,726 announced deals during the period from 1998 to 2007 
In addition, we use several variables that are firm-specific drivers of information asymmetry, 
including firm size (Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988), Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002)), 
illiquidity (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), distress risk (Griffin and Lemmon (2002)), and analyst 
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following (Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Chang, Dasgupta, and 
Hilary (2006)). More specifically, we obtain market capitalization (Size) at the end of the quarter from 
the CRSP database. We compute book-to-market ratios (B/M) at year ends using data from the CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT databases.   We also include the market (CRSP value-weighted index) adjusted past 
twelve-month return (Adj. Past Return) to control for momentum. We employ a variant of the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure (developed by Hasbrouck (2009)) as the proxy for trading liquidity 
(Illiquidity).  We compute this measure as the yearly average of the square root of |return|/(price 
volume).  We measure analyst coverage of a firm by counting the number of analysts in the I/B/E/S 
database (available through WRDS) that make at least one forecast or recommendation on the firm 
during the year (Analysts).  We proxy the probability of financial distress with the distance-to-default 
(DtD), which refers to the number of standard deviation decreases in firm value before it drops to the 
face value of debt (i.e., the firm is in default). This measure is motivated by Merton’s (1974) bond 
pricing model and estimated for each firm at the end of each year following the procedure in Vassalou 
and Xing (2004). Because DtD is a one-sided measure, we use a dummy variable for DtD to be smaller 
than 1.64 as an indicator for non-negligible distress risk (i.e., the estimated probability of distress being 
5% or higher). Finally, we measure the Volatility and IdioVol by the standard deviation of the returns 
and residuals from Carhart (1997) four-factor model for past 36 months of stock returns, respectively.    
 Panel A of Table III reports the summary statistics of the stock-level variables discussed above 
separately for positions included in the original filings and those in the confidential filings of hedge 
funds.  Differences along all dimensions are statistically significant at the 1% level in favor of greater 
information asymmetry in the confidential holdings.  Stocks in confidential holdings of hedge funds are 
smaller, have higher book-to-market ratio, lower analyst coverage, higher distress risk, higher volatility, 
and higher idiosyncratic volatility compared to the stocks in the original filings.  Moreover, stocks in 
confidential holdings are far more likely to have been recent targets in M&A announcements, a 
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probability of 7.5% versus 4.1% for the original filings, pointing to risk arbitrage as an important motive 
underlying confidential treatment.22   The Stark Onshore Management LLC featured in Appendix A is 
an example:  39 out of 55 confidential holdings were targets in M&A announcements within a year up to 
the end of the quarter.    
[Insert Table III here.] 
Many of the variables, such as Size, Illiquidity, Analyst, and Idio. Vol., also represent established 
proxies for trading liquidity.  Hence, some of the results also conform to the price impact motive, which 
is closely intertwined with private information, as we discuss before in Section II.B.  On the other hand, 
stocks in confidential filings experience slightly higher (not statistically significant) market-adjusted 
returns in the past twelve months as those of original holdings, which contradicts a performance-based 
window dressing motive where money managers hide losing positions in order to make their disclosed 
portfolios look smart. Nevertheless, significantly higher total and idiosyncratic volatilities of the 
confidential holdings are still consistent with a risk-based window dressing motive of money managers 
to make their portfolio appear less risky to their investors. This result is analogous to Musto’s (1999) 
findings regarding money-market fund managers’ over-weighting less risky government issues before 
portfolio disclosure dates. 
We supplement the univariate analyses in panel A of Table III with multivariate logistic 
regressions.  The model specification is as follows: 
 , , , , ,( 0),i j q i q q Ind i j qCH StockChar         (5) 
where , ,i j qCH  is a dummy variable equal to one if stock i is in the confidential holdings of institution j in 
quarter q.  The all-sample average of , ,i j qCH  is 2.2%.  ,i qStockChar  is the same vector of stock 
characteristics variables used in panel A.  In addition to the quarterly dummies ( q ), the Fama and 
French (1997) 10 industry dummies ( Ind ) are added to regression in equation (5) to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level.  Results without the industry dummies are qualitatively 
24 
 
similar and marginally stronger. We report the estimated coefficients ˆ, their associated t-statistics, and 
the average partial effects (APE) of the ,i qStockChar variables in panel B of Table III.  More specifically, 
we compute the APEs as the empirical analogue to 
    
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 Because Size, Analyst, Illiquidity, Volatility, and Idio. Vol. have high pairwise correlations (with 
absolute values above 0.60), we try specifications that have only one of these five variables at a time 
(corresponding to columns 1 to 5), as well as having four of these five variables together in 
specifications (6) and (7).  Results in panel B provide messages broadly consistent with those in panel 
A.   
 More specifically, targets of announced M&A deals have probabilities of being confidential 
holdings that are two percentage points higher than non-targets, about doubling the unconditional 
probability for stocks to appear in confidential filings.  Inter-quartile changes in Size, Illiquidity, Analyst, 
and Idio. Vol. are associated with incremental probabilities of 1.5, 0.3, 0.1 and 0.1 percentage points.  
Such magnitudes (especially the one associated with Size) are sizable relative to the unconditional 
probability, indicating that these variables are driving significant portion of variations in the data.   
  
 
C. Trading during the Confidential Period 
If hedge funds are protecting private information through confidentiality because the information 
still has value and they have not completed accumulating the position, then they should be expected to 
trade more in the confidential stocks during the period of confidentiality.  Given that revealing 
information about the holdings helps the convergence of price to the private valuation of the informed 
trader (e.g., Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001)), hedge funds should not be averse to disclosure if they 
have completed the planned acquisitions.23 This section investigates these issues by analyzing inter-
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quarter trading during the confidential periods.  We report the results in Table IV. 
[Insert Table IV here.] 
Table IV reveals several notable contrasts between hedge funds’ trading in confidential and 
original holdings from the two-sample t-tests. The initial positions (as percentage of shares outstanding) 
are only slightly (not significant) larger in the confidential holdings, but hedge funds trade more 
aggressively on their confidential positions during the following quarters within the confidential periods. 
The aggressiveness in trading is measured by both total trading volume (the sum of unsigned inter-
quarter changes in holdings, scaled by either shares outstanding or by the initial position), and the 
difference between the maximum and initial position (using the same scaling variables).  Trading 
activities in confidential holdings almost triple those in original holdings by the same funds using all 
measures, and all differences but one are significant at the 5% level.  For example, the average total 
trading volume in confidential stocks is 0.96% of the shares outstanding, versus 0.34% for the average 
stock in the original holdings.  The maximum position in a confidential stock during the confidential 
period is 6.55 times the initial position on average, while the same multiple for a stock in the original 
holdings is 3.03.  Finally, it takes much longer for hedge funds to accumulate to the maximum position 
of a confidential holding (2.58 quarters on average) than a regular holding (0.93 quarters), justifying the 
price impact motive for seeking confidentiality beyond the normal delay of 45 days from the quarter 
end.   
Hedge fund managers may choose to disclose after liquidation, or after completing the 
accumulation of their positions but before liquidating them. Of the 37,204 confidential holdings 
examined in Table IV, the managers disclose 27,306 (73.4%) positions after liquidating them.  Out of 
the remaining 9,898 (26.6%), 7,844 (79.3%) see no further acquisition in the confidential holdings in the 
quarter after the disclosure while 2,054 (20.7%) exhibit further build-up in the positions.  The overall 





IV. Performance of Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds 
 The presence of positive abnormal returns is necessary to differentiate the private information 
hypothesis from alternative motives to seek confidentiality. Though price impact influences the pace at 
which the price adjusts to information, it should not affect the cumulative stock return over the entire 
confidential period, extending up to twelve months. Hence performance analysis in this section provides 
a sharp test of the private information hypothesis.  
 
A. Choice of Performance Measure 
We adopt two abnormal performance measures. The first measure is the Carhart (1997) four-
factor alpha using imputed daily returns assuming the holdings at the end of the previous quarter. We do 
not resort to Fung and Hsieh (2004) hedge fund factors because they are meant for alternative asset 
classes while we are analyzing equity positions exclusively. The second performance measure is the 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (henceforth “DGTW”) benchmark-adjusted return.  We 
form 125 portfolios, in June of each year, using all the common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ based on a three-way quintile sorting along the size (using the NYSE size-quintile), book-
market ratio, and momentum dimensions.  The abnormal performance of a given stock is its return in 
excess of that of the benchmark portfolio to which it belongs, and the average DGTW benchmark-
adjusted return for each portfolio aggregates over all the component stocks using value-weighting in the 
portfolio.  Sensitivity analysis using equal weights yields similar results. 
While alpha is the most commonly used metric to assess abnormal returns in the literature, the 
DGTW measure has the advantage for its focus on stock picking abilities.  Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, 
and Wermers (1997) decompose the superior performance of money managers into stock selectivity, 
style timing, and execution costs.  Given that applications for confidential treatment need to be made at 
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the individual stock level, the justifiable private information should mostly be stock-specific rather than 
about asset classes or overall market timing. Further, our analyses are based on holdings that do not 
incorporate transaction costs.  Therefore, the DGTW measure, which corresponds to the stock 
characteristic selectivity component, serves well as a complement to the more conventional alpha 
measures.  
 
B. Comparing Return Performance of Confidential and Original Holdings 
We assess the performance of confidential holdings by comparing their abnormal returns during 
the confidential periods to those of the original holdings of the same institution during the same periods 
of time. We group the length of confidential periods into seven grids from two months up to one year, 
where each specific horizon includes confidential periods that are at least as long as that horizon but 
shorter than the next horizon.  For example, all confidential filings that are filed at a delay of at least 
three months but shorter than four months from the portfolio at the end of the quarter are grouped in the 
three-month horizon grid.  Constraining performance evaluation of confidential holdings to be within 
their confidential periods is necessary to both ensure the property motive for remaining confidential and 
to avoid the price impact due to disclosure.   
Panel A of Table V reports the return performance of original and confidential holdings 
separately, as well as their differences, using value-weighted four-factor alpha and the DGTW 
benchmark-adjusted return measure.  For the DGTW measure, we use the same benchmark portfolio 
throughout the return horizon under consideration to ensure consistency.   
[Insert Table V here.] 
The results provide strong evidence that confidential holdings exhibit higher benchmark-adjusted 
returns compared to original holdings over all seven horizons from two to twelve months, where the 
differences are statistically significant at the 10% level or better for all but one horizon.  The difference 
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in the four-factor alpha amounts to 2.57 (2.05) basis points daily over the two-month (twelve-month) 
horizon, corresponding to annualized return spreads of 6.48% (5.17%) in favor of confidential 
holdings.24  Similarly, the difference in the DGTW measure is 5.26% (7.51%) over the two-month 
(twelve-month) horizon.  The presence of such superior returns supports that confidential holdings are 
more informed than original holdings. Moreover, the persistence of the abnormal returns up to one year 
suggests that returns are unlikely to be driven by the temporary price pressure from trading by the filers.   
Griffin and Xu (2009) document limited evidence of skill by hedge funds using the original 
holdings from Thomson Reuters Ownership database.  To facilitate comparison, we apply their 
methodology separately on hedge funds’ original and confidential holdings, that is, we compute the raw 
returns and DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns at three months after the quarter-end for each 
institution-quarter using both value- or equal-weighting, and then average across all institution-quarter 
portfolios in the sample period. We report the results in panel B of Table V.  We replicate the results of 
Griffin and Xu (2009) regarding original holdings, but further show that the confidential holdings 
significantly outperform the original holdings of hedge funds by 5.0% (3.5%) per annum using the 
value-weighted (equal-weighted) DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns.  This comparison reiterates the 
private information motive underlying hedge funds’ confidential filings as well as the presence of their 
superior stock selection ability. 
 
C. Acquisition- and Disposition-Motivated Confidential Holdings 
Hedge funds may seek confidential treatment for stocks that are part of their ongoing acquisition 
or disposition plans.  When information driven, the nature of the two types could be quite different as 
the former (latter) should entail positive (negative) private information.  A separation of the two types 
can sharpen our tests. 
The acquisition/disposition purpose is not explicitly stated in the confidential filings and 
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therefore can only be identified with an approximation algorithm.  For each stock in a confidential filing, 
we compare the position (adjusted for stock splits) at the current quarter-end (t) to that of the same stock 
by the same institution at the previous quarter-end (t-1), and classify net increase (decrease) as 
acquisition (disposition). In case of no change (5.4% of the sample), we break the tie by relying on the 
position change of the same stock in the next quarter forward (t+1) relative to the current one.  This 
algorithm is analogous to Lee and Ready (1991) in classifying the direction of trades. Such an algorithm 
classifies 80.7% (19.3%) of the confidential positions of hedge funds as acquisition- (disposition-) 
motivated.  Table VI replicates Table V separately for acquisitions and dispositions.   
[Insert Table VI here.] 
Table VI confirms that acquisition-motivated confidential holdings exhibit higher benchmark-
adjusted returns compared to original holdings, and differences are statistically significant for almost all 
horizons up to one year. The spreads at different horizons are also economically significant.  At the one-
year horizon, the performance difference amounts to 3.88 and 7.06 percentage points using four-factor 
alphas and DGTW measures respectively.  In contrast, results of disposition-motivated subsample are 
not nearly as consistent, possibly because on-going dispositions are more likely to be liquidity driven.  
In such cases, hedge funds may still benefit from confidential filings in mitigating the adverse price 
impact that might ensue had they carried out the disposition in the open, even though we do not observe 
as strong abnormal returns of these confidential positions. 
In a robustness check, we classify acquisitions and dispositions by primarily relying on the 
position changes from the current to the subsequent quarter end (i.e., a “forward” rather than the 
“backward” classification approach used in Table VI).  We report the results in Table IA.II in the 
Internet Appendix and find them to be qualitatively similar. 
 
D. Sensitivity checks 
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 First, like all the studies based on the quarter-end holdings data, our study does not capture the 
effects of inter-quarter trades and assumes that portfolios at any given time are identical to those at the 
previous quarter end.  If some inter-quarter trades are informed (see Puckett and Yan (2011) for such 
evidence), then our return results are biased downwards.  Assuming quarter-end portfolio formation also 
tends to produce conservative return measures if the positions are actually accumulated throughout the 
quarter.  However, this stringent assumption is necessary to avoid any look-back bias or attributing 
superior performance to momentum trading, and is the default method adopted by the literature.  If we 
adopt the same aggregation procedure as in panel A of Table V but use beginning of the quarter as the 
portfolio formation date, return measures are markedly higher:  3.2% for original and 5.0% for 
confidential holdings during the holding quarter.  The difference of 1.8% (7.2% annualized) is highly 
significant (t-statistic = 4.81).  The truth is probably somewhere between, but we do not wish to over-
interpret the strengthened results given the possible look-back bias for any assumed portfolio formation 
date other than the quarter end.  
Second, the presence of derivatives in hedge funds’ positions may bias our results if they are 
systematically used to offset the long positions filed in the 13F, especially those in the confidential 
holdings.  While we cannot refute such a possibility due to the lack of disclosure and transparency of 
derivatives holdings and short positions, two pieces of evidence are helpful.  The first piece is provided 
by Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) showing that hedge funds following equity and event-driven 
strategies (which constitute a great majority of the funds in our sample) have the lowest leverage 
through derivatives among all major strategy categories.  The second piece of evidence comes from our 
own analysis of abnormal performance of confidential and original holdings after excluding those stock 
positions that are accompanied with reported positions in call and/or put options. For this purpose, we 
collect information on all option positions included in both confidential and original holdings from 
SEC’s EDGAR database.25  For our sample hedge funds, the median position in options in zero; and the 
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mean call, put, and a combination of call and put positions are 0.8%, 0.6%, and 0.6% of the stock 
positions. Once the stocks with option positions are excluded, confidential holdings continue to 
outperform the original holdings in the two-month to twelve-month horizons: with the four-factor alpha 
ranging from 2.48% to 1.64%, and the DGTW measure from 4.76% to 7.01%. We report the results in 
Table IA.III of the Internet Appendix.   
Needless to say, confidential treatment is not the only way that hedge funds can gain undisclosed 
long exposure in a stock.  Derivatives contracts such as total return swaps that are traded over the 
counter can accomplish the same goal.  Nevertheless the two approaches are far from perfect substitutes 
even without considering differential transaction costs.  For example, when the block-building aims at 
influencing corporate policies or control, then the long position with which the voting rights are 
endowed becomes necessary.  This explains why confidential treatment is constantly sought after by 
M&A arbitrageurs and activist shareholders.      
 Next, we replicate panel A of Table V for the category of investment companies/advisors, and 
report results in Table IA.IV of the Internet Appendix. The abnormal returns for the confidential 
holdings of this category are similar to those of hedge funds but weaker in magnitude. This is expected 
as hedge funds are arguably the most active portfolio managers and among the most aggressive in 
seeking private information.  Banks and insurance companies are only sporadic users of the confidential 
treatment (see panel B of Table I) and their confidential holdings do not exhibit any positive abnormal 
returns.   
 Finally, we ensure that our results are not driven by a handful of outlying institutions listed in 
panel C of Table I, who seek confidentiality frequently and have been rejected most of the time.  Such 
institutions, notably, Caxton Corporation and D.E. Shaw & Co. Inc., may resort to confidential filings as 
a systematic way to avoid revealing their holdings, rather than to protect occasional stock-level private 
information.  When we exclude these two institutions, we find slightly stronger results, as shown in 
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Table IA.V of the Internet Appendix. 
 
V. Denial of Confidentiality Requests 
The SEC rules state clearly that confidential treatment is meant to be an exception rather than a 
rule.  Given the perceived benefits of seeking confidentiality, it is necessary to discuss the associated 
costs of doing so, especially beyond the intended purpose.  So far in our analyses, we have pooled 
confidential filings that are denied with those that are not denied; among the latter we cannot accurately 
distinguish between applications that are approved and those that do not receive SEC decision before the 
term expires.  An analysis of the causes for rejection and the resulting market responses helps us to 
assess the cost of denials. 
 
A. Causes for Denials of Confidentiality Requests 
The SEC does not publicize the specific reasons for rejecting individual applications other than 
stating the general principle of requiring adequate factual support for the need of confidentiality on a 
stock-by-stock basis.  Therefore, we attempt to reverse-engineer the causes for denials on a large sample 
basis using the following probit model: 
 , , , ,( 0) ( 0),j q j q j q q j qDenial CFChar InstChar          (6) 
The dependent variable, (Denialj,q > 0), is the indicator variable for the denial of a confidential filing in 
the institution-quarter (j, q).  The regressors include a vector of confidential filing characteristics 
(CFChar), institutional characteristics (InstChar), and quarterly dummies to control for unspecified time 
effects.  
Table VII reports the estimation of equation (6), conditional on the subsample of confidential 
filings. We first identify several observable characteristics from confidential filings, i.e., the number of 
past filings (# Past CF), the frequency of denials in the past (% Past Denied), the number of distinct 
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stocks in the filings as a fraction of total number of distinct stocks held (% Conf. Stocks), the value of 
the confidential holdings (Value CF), the value of the confidential holdings as fraction of the value of 
total holdings (% Value CF), and the average shares in confidential holdings as a percentage of shares 
outstanding (Avg. Conf. Position).  Since four of our variables  % Conf. Stocks, % Value CF, 
Log(Value CF), and Avg. Conf. Position, are highly correlated, we first report the results by including 
them individually in specifications (1) to (4) in Table VII. The next two specifications (5) and (6) show 
the results pooling the regressors but still excluding either % Value CF or Log(Value CF) due to the 
near-perfect collinearity between these two variables.   
[Insert Table VII here.] 
We expect the denial decision to be positively related to % Conf. Stocks, Value CF, % Value CF, 
and Avg. Conf. Position given that the intended purpose of the amendment to 13(f) is to provide 
occasional relief from disclosure for a small number of stocks by institutions who can demonstrate 
adequate factual support. We also expect that institutions that have been denied frequently in the past 
earn a reputation of potential abusers, which endangers their future prospects of obtaining approvals.  
Our findings are broadly consistent with these predictions.  
First, in all specifications, we find denial probabilities are positively related to past denial rates, 
and this is the single most important predictor of future denials.  For two otherwise comparable 
institutions with past denial rates of zero and 50% respectively, the probability of their being denied in 
the future will differ by 27 percentage points, indicating a serious cost from a bad reputation.26 Second, 
we observe higher denial probabilities are positively and significantly (at the 5% level) associated with 
both % Conf. Stocks and Avg. Conf. Position indicating greater probability of denial when funds try to 
mask a larger portion of their portfolios.  
The above results are robust to the inclusion of fund characteristics that we employ earlier in 
Table II to analyze the determinants of seeking confidentiality.  In addition, we find negative 
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coefficients on Log(PortSize) and Turnover, statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Therefore, the confidentiality requests by larger and more actively managed (i.e., high 
turnover) hedge funds are less likely to be denied by the SEC, consistent with these funds being the ones 
likely to possess private information and being vulnerable to price impact.    
 
B. Market Reaction to Disclosure of Confidential Filings 
We study the market’s reaction to the disclosure of the confidential filings, especially ones in 
response to the SEC denials, for two related purposes.  First, a significant market reaction to positions 
involuntarily disclosed due to relatively speedy denials is a powerful piece of evidence supporting the 
private information motive of seeking confidentiality.  Moreover, such a market reaction is costly to the 
filers because the market price adjustment prevents the filers from further benefiting from the private 
information now prematurely revealed.  This should restrain the institutions from seeking confidentiality 
aggressively because, as Table VII shows, past denials make future denials more likely. 
To sharpen our tests, we focus on the market's reaction to the quick denials, classified as filings 
that are denied within 45 to 180 days after the quarter-end portfolio date. In these cases, funds will be 
forced to reveal their stock positions earlier than they would choose to.  If the positions contain private 
information, their exogenous revelation should generate market reactions.  In contrast, after a similar 
length of delay, when hedge funds voluntarily disclose their confidential holdings that are not denied, 
there should not be significant market responses because the funds presumably have fully benefitted 
from their information.   
We design the tests along this line and report the results in Table VIII.  More specifically, Table 
VIII reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the quick denials and non-denial cases 
of confidential filings over three windows around the event date: [1, +1], [2, +2], and [5, +5] days.  
The event date is the amendment filing date that discloses the confidential positions. We conduct the 
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event study separately for the involuntary disclosures due to denials and the voluntary disclosures of 
non-denial cases.  For each stock in each filing, we first estimate abnormal returns using a market model 
with equally-weighted CRSP market index. We estimate the factor loadings with daily data over a 
period of 300 to 91 days before the event date, and use Scholes and Williams (1977) approach to 
account for non-synchronous trading. We then equally weight the CARs of individual stocks to compute 
the CARs for each filing. The mean CARs for the quick denials over the three windows are positive: 
0.54%, 0.97%, and 1.19%, and are all significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the mean CAR figures for 
the non-denial cases of confidential filings are smaller and none is significant.  These results again 
support the private information hypothesis.   
[Insert Table VIII here.] 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Despite a general lack of economically significant and persistent abnormal performance among 
active portfolio managers as a whole as documented by the literature (French, 2008), our study of a 
selective subset of institutional investors’ portfolios, i.e., the confidential holdings of hedge funds, 
reveals positive evidence of managerial skill in stock picking.   
Our findings also offer an explanation to the ongoing resistance by investment managers against 
ownership and holdings disclosure, and inform the debate on the optimal level of ownership or holdings 
disclosure.  While timely disclosure contributes to market transparency and enhances investor 
monitoring of money managers, it may also dilute the incentives for active portfolio managers to acquire 
information by encouraging free riding and front running.  We show that confidential treatment provides 
tangible relief for institutions from revealing their private information about the issuers before reaping 
the full benefits, and from incurring additional trading costs due to leakage of information regarding 
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their own on-going trading plans.  Except for a handful of extreme cases, we find that the great majority 
of institutions resort to confidentiality selectively.   
  Our study also points to the limitation of using conventional 13F databases that ignore 
confidential holdings.  The bias is likely to be small if the purpose of the research is to track aggregate 
institutional holdings in public companies or to assess the overall portfolio performance of any large 
sample of institutional investors. However, given the importance of confidential holdings conditional on 
a confidential filing (on average, one-third of the total portfolio value for hedge funds), their 
disproportionate association with information sensitive events (notably M&As), and their concentration 
on stocks with higher level of information asymmetry, ignoring them could be a significant omission in 
analyzing position changes of individual institutions or in response to specific events.  Such information 
is also potentially important for investment managers who use Form 13F information in formulating 
investment strategies, predicting implementation costs, and identifying likely counterparties in large 
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Appendix A: Confidential Holdings of Stark Onshore Management LLC 
 
 This table lists all the common stock confidential holdings reported in the 13F amendments filed 
by Stark Onshore Management LLC over the sample period 1999Q1-2007Q2.  “Issuer Name” is the 
name of the company issuing the common stock. “Shares” is the number of shares held by Stark 
Onshore on the portfolio date. “Portfolio Date” is the quarter-end date for which the portfolio holdings 
are reported. “Filing Date” is the date when the 13F amendment is filed. “Thomson Reuters” is an 
indicator variable for whether the holding is reported to the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database. 
“M&A Target” is an indicator variable for whether the issuer company was a target in a merger and 
acquisition announcement during the four-quarter period ending in the portfolio quarter. 
  
Issuer Name CUSIP Shares 
Portfolio 





Anthem Inc 94973V10 67,360 9/30/2004 2/14/2005 No No 
Cox Communications Inc 22404410 269,964 9/30/2004 2/14/2005 No No 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc 59161010 60,000 9/30/2004 2/14/2005 No Yes 
Sears Holdings 81238710 390,800 12/31/2004 5/13/2005 No Yes 
Symantec Corp 87150310 161,650 12/31/2004 8/16/2005 No No 
Gold Fields Ltd 38059T10 73,277 3/31/2005 8/16/2005 No No 
Symantec Corp 87150310 161,650 3/31/2005 8/16/2005 No No 
Sungard Data Systems 86736310 1,557,250 3/31/2005 9/27/2005 No Yes 
Unocal Corp 91528910 393,650 3/31/2005 9/27/2005 No No 
MCI Communications Corp 55269110 2,103,850 3/31/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Sungard Data Systems 86736310 1,557,250 6/30/2005 9/27/2005 No Yes 
Unocal Corp 91528910 393,650 6/30/2005 9/27/2005 No Yes 
Brookstone Inc 11453710 98,463 6/30/2005 10/7/2005 No Yes 
Infousa Inc New Com 45670G10 221,542 6/30/2005 10/7/2005 No Yes 
Metals Usa Inc 59132420 183,275 6/30/2005 10/7/2005 No Yes 
Cablevision Systems Corp 12686C10 281,250 6/30/2005 1/6/2006 No Yes 
Medicis Pharmaceutical 58469030 13,750 6/30/2005 1/6/2006 No No 
AT&T Corp 00195750 6,250 6/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
MCI Communications Corp 55269110 1,119,450 6/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Gold Banc Corp Inc 37990710 555,203 9/30/2005 12/15/2005 No No 
AT&T Corp 00195750 6,250 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Bei Technologies Inc 05538P10 46,200 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Cablevision Systems Corp 12686C10 281,250 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Chiron Corp 17004010 506,040 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Hibernia Corp 42865610 525,000 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 






Issuer Name CUSIP Shares 
Portfolio 





Medicis Pharmaceutical 58469030 13,750 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No No 
Metals Usa Inc 59132420 185,775 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No Yes 
Petrokazakhstan Inc 71649P10 93,750 9/30/2005 2/15/2006 No No 
Guidant Corporation 40169810 61,650 9/30/2005 5/19/2006 No Yes 
Boston Scientific Corp 10113710 506,250 12/31/2005 5/19/2006 No No 
Guidant Corporation 40169810 397,011 12/31/2005 5/19/2006 No Yes 
Ipayment, Inc 46262E10 26,360 12/31/2005 5/19/2006 No Yes 
Independence Comm. Bank Corp 45341410 373,797 12/31/2005 6/5/2006 No Yes 
Albertson's Inc 01310410 392,240 3/31/2006 6/5/2006 No Yes 
Independence Comm. Bank Corp 45341410 13,677 3/31/2006 6/5/2006 No Yes 
Education Management Corp 28139T10 411,591 3/31/2006 8/15/2006 No Yes 
Thomas Nelson 64037610 75,360 3/31/2006 8/15/2006 No Yes 
Capital One Financial 14040H10 110,000 3/31/2006 11/20/2006 No No 
Engelhard Corp 29284510 72,800 3/31/2006 11/20/2006 No Yes 
Keyspan Corp 14040H10 396,780 3/31/2006 2/20/2007 No Yes 
Capital One Financial 14040H10 145,000 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No No 
Commercial Capital Bancorp, Inc 20162L10 443,073 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No Yes 
Exelon Corp 30161N10 783,500 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No No 
Fisher Scientific Intl 33803220 116,080 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No Yes 
Kinder Morgan Inc 49455P10 202,340 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No Yes 
Nco Group Inc 62885810 407,999 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No Yes 
Public Service Enterprise Group 74457310 730,774 6/30/2006 11/20/2006 No No 
Keyspan Corp 49337W10 540,040 6/30/2006 2/20/2007 No Yes 
Longview Fibre Co 54321310 40,000 6/30/2006 2/20/2007 No Yes 
Constellation Energy Group Inc 21037110 648,660 6/30/2006 5/3/2007 No Yes 
Northwestern Corp 66807430 175,832 6/30/2006 5/3/2007 No Yes 
Univision Communications Inc 91490610 1,298,435 6/30/2006 5/3/2007 No Yes 
Multi Fineline Electronix In 62541B10 933,653 3/31/2007 5/16/2007 Yes No 




Appendix B: The Classification of 13F Filing Institutions 
The classification of institution types employed in this paper refines the one used in the Thomson 
Reuters database.  Thomson Reuters divides all institutions into five types:  banks (type code = 1, mostly 
commercial banks), insurance companies (type code = 2), investment companies (type code = 3, mostly 
mutual fund management companies), independent investment advisors (type code = 4, including asset 
management companies, investment banks, brokers, private wealth management companies, etc.), and 
others (type code = 5, including pension funds, endowment funds, most of the hedge funds, financial 
arms of corporations, and others).  The type code 5, especially since 1998, is known to be problematic in 
that the category could include many misclassified institutions that should be assigned with the other 
type codes (mostly, type code 4), a problem acknowledged by the database. As a result, the “other” 
category, instead of being a residual claimant, turns out to be the largest category in the Thomson 
database, accounting for over 50% of all institutions in recent years. 
We made the following changes to the Thomson classification of institutional categories.  We 
first divide all institutions into four groups: (i) hedge funds, (ii) investment companies and investment 
advisors (a combination of type 3 and type 4 institutions by the Thomson classification, excluding hedge 
funds), (iii) banks and insurance companies (a combination of type 1 and type 2 institutions by the 
Thomson classification), and (iv) other institutions. For institutions in our sample that are not covered by 
Thomson, we manually classify them.   
Next, we made major corrections for the “other” category as classified by Thomson. First, we 
reassign all hedge funds from this category. Second, we reassign an institution which has type code 5 
after 1997 to an earlier code, if available and if different from 5. Third, we manually classify the 
remaining institutions (mainly based on information from the institutions’ websites and news articles) 
and reassign all investment companies and advisors.  After all these corrections, the “other” category 
shrinks sharply to about 4% of all institutions in our sample. 
45 
 
                                                 
1 Such attempts have not been successful.  Philip Goldstein, an activist hedge fund manager at Bulldog Investors, likens his 
stock holdings to “trade secrets” as much as the protected formula used to make Coke, and contends that complying with the 
13F rule “constitute[s] a ‘taking’ of [the fund’s] property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution.” For a more detailed discussion, see Philip Goldstein’s interview in September 12, 2006 issue of Business 
Week:   http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291.htm. 
2 For the initial SEC release in 1979, please see http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-15979.pdf. The current SEC official 
guideline for 13F amendments is available at:  http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form13f.pdf.  Section “Instructions for 
Confidential Treatment Requests” details the requirements.  
3 Although the SEC does not provide information about all denial cases, we find online documents for a few cases. For 
example, see http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-52134.pdf for the rejection of the request from a hedge fund, Two Sigma. 
There are several other cases of rejections of confidential treatment requests including those by Warren Buffett:  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-50206.htm,  http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-43142.htm, and 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-43909.htm.   
4 There is a subtle difference between ownership and holdings.  Some rules (such as Schedule 13(d) and 13(g)) require 
disclosure by the beneficial owners, while others (such as Section 13(f)) mandate disclosure of holdings over which the 
investment manager has investment discretion but not necessarily beneficial ownership.   
5 Report of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1975). See 
Lemke and Lins (1987) for a detailed discussion of the background, legislative history, and requirements of the institutional 
disclosure program under Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
6 See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/13fpt2.htm for the letter issued by the SEC in June 1998 where they 
explain the specific requirements and conditions for granting confidentiality. 
7 For a full story, please see “Large Investors Face Stiff Rules on SEC Filings,” by Paul Beckett, The Wall Street Journal, 
June 19, 1998.   
8 See “SEC:  D.E. Shaw Disclosure Request Part of Regular Process,” by Marietta Cauchi, Dow Jones Newswires, January 
2005.  
9 See “Mum's the Word for Some Investors --- SEC Allows Money Managers Who Say Confidentiality Is Key to Conceal 
Certain Stock Holdings,” The Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2011. 
10 The manual for Thomson Reuters Ownership Data, available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), provides 
the following caveat about its S12 (for mutual funds) and S34 (for institutions) data: “The holdings in the S12 and S34 sets 
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are rarely the entire equity holdings of the manager or fund. There are minimum size requirements and confidentiality 




11 A form 13F-HR/A states on its cover regarding whether it is an “Amendment” (i.e., whether it adds new holdings) or a 
“Restatement.”  For our purpose, we only include forms with the “Amendment” box checked. 
12 Aragon and Martin (2009) also found similar proportions of delayed original 13F filings. We do not observe a systematic 
pattern in late filing of original Form 13F. For example, only a very small number of institutions are repeatedly late. 
Systematically late or missing filings entail legal risk for the filers. 
13 The effective delay in disclosure enjoyed by denied confidential treatment could potentially invite abuse.  Our informal 
conversation with the SEC staff indicates that institutions which received repeated rejections could receive warnings and will 
be subject to more timely review in future applications. This view is consistent with our empirical analysis in Section V.  
Moreover, the average time it takes for the SEC to reject applications had shortened considerably from the earlier to the later 
years of our sample, from over a year to about nine months. 
14 For more details on the classification criteria of 13F-filing hedge funds, see Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2010).  
15  An internet appendix for this article is available online in the “Supplements and Datasets” section at 
http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp. 
16 We followed these two institutions out of the sample period.  Caxton ceased to seek confidential treatment after October 
2005 when eight of its applications were rejected all at once.  D. E. Shaw stopped confidential filing after its last one in our 
sample in June 2007 for about a year.  It has filed three applications since June 2008 each of which covers 23 stocks only 
(compared to hundreds and thousands before).  All the three applications received speedy reviews and were approved by the 
SEC.  These two cases are consistent with the discussion in footnote 13.  
17 Our model, like ones in HHL and other related papers, analyzes the disclosure of trades rather than that of positions which 
is the subject of our empirical tests.  For the purpose of theoretical motivation, we assume that the main cost of disclosing 
quarter-end positions come from the revelation of trades.  In reality, quarter-end position disclosure only reveals inter-quarter, 
but not intra-quarter, trades.  However, the intuition of our model goes through. 
18 It is worth noting that intra-quarter trades underestimate the prevalence of “slow building.” Wang (2010) shows that money 
managers are more likely to initiate new trades at the beginning of the quarter, and tend to complete new round-trip trades 
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toward the end of the quarter.  Such trading pattern reflects a trade-off between minimizing the impact from disclosure and 
compromising on the quality of trades. 
19 We calculate purchases (sales) as the sum of the products of positive (negative) changes in the number of shares in the 
holdings from the previous to the current quarter-end and the average of the stocks prices at the two quarter-ends.  The logic 
of using the lesser (rather than the average) of purchases and sales is to free the measure from the impact of net flows—a 
practice used in mutual fund research (e.g., by Morningstar) in defining portfolio turnover rates.   
20 Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2010) provides a detailed description of the union database as well as its matching to the 13F data. 
21 Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2011) use this data.  We thank the authors for sharing this data with us. 
22 In contrast, future M&A targets are not over-represented in the confidential holdings, that is, hedge funds speculating on 
future M&A activities do not systematically resort to confidential filings to hide their predicted targets.  One explanation is 
that the SEC exercises heightened scrutiny on trading before M&A announcement.  Therefore, hedge funds may not want to 
explicitly seek confidentiality for such potentially legally sensitive positions. 
23 In fact, some successful money managers, such as Warren Buffet (Berkshire Hathaway) and David Einhorn (Greenlight 
Capital), frequently talk in public about the positions they have taken.   
24 Using the simple one-factor alpha would yield a difference of 1.76 (2.74) basis points per day over the two-month (twelve-
month) horizon, corresponding to annualized return spreads of 4.43 (6.90) percentage points. 
25 Almost all exchange traded options are “13(f) securities” and their holdings are required to be disclosed in the Form 13F.  
We verify the Form 13F coverage by cross-checking with the OptionMetrics database (available through WRDS). Note that 
information on the option holdings is not available in Thomson Reuters Ownership database. 
26 This pattern is also consistent with persistence in some applicants’ noncompliance which leads to repeated rejections.  We 
find that past denials not only lead to higher likelihood of future denials, but also lead to faster denials in the future.  On 
average, every past denial cuts 10 days into the time it takes for the SEC to deny an application from the same fund in the 
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Summary Statistics of 13F Original and Confidential Filings  
 
Panel A of the table reports the distribution of the delay (in number of days) between the quarter-end portfolio date and 
the filing date for all original and confidential 13F filings (the “preliminary sample”).   In Panel B, we use the “final 
sample” that excludes observations with extreme delays, i.e., more than 180 days for the original filings, and confidential 
filings with less than 45-day or more than 1,505-day (4 years plus 45 days) delay. Panel B summarizes the number of 
filings, the number of institutions, the dollar value, the number of stocks, and the average stock ownership share in the 
final sample. The classification of institutions (Hedge Fund, Investment Company or Advisor, Bank and Insurance) is 
described in the Appendix B. The statistics for the two types of holdings are reported separately, and those of the 
confidential holdings are compared to the combined portfolio of the confidential filings and their corresponding original 
holdings.  Panel C reports the number of confidential filings and percent of rejected filings of the top ten institutions that 
seek confidential treatment and the top ten institutions that are most frequently denied of their requests for confidential 
treatment. Both the original and confidential filings are at the institution level. The institution types “HF” and “INVCO” 
are abbreviations of “Hedge Fund” and “Investment Company or Advisor”. 
 
Panel A:  Delay Period between Portfolio Date and Filing Date 
 
Original 13F Form Filings           Total 
Delay 
(in days) 030 3145 4660 61180 > 180 
Number 12,332 33,645 5,424 1190 705 53,296 
Percent 23.14% 63.13% 10.18% 2.23% 1.32% 
 
Confidential 13F Form Filings 
Delay 
(in days) 030 3145 4660 61180 181410 411775 7761505 > 1505 
Number 34 105 123 485 703 277 103 27 1,857  
Percent 1.83% 5.65% 6.62% 26.12% 37.86% 14.92% 5.55% 1.45% 





Panel B: Summary Statistics of Original and Confidential Holdings by Institution Types 
 
  Institution type 






Original 13F Form Filings 
# of institutions 942 1,842 350 3,134 
# of 13F filings 14,002 31,963 6,307 52,272 
$ million per institution-quarter (Mean) 1,313.2 3,366.3 6,755.6 3,225.5 
$ million per institution-quarter (Median) 270.0 268.3 486.0 286.9 
# of stocks per institution-quarter (Mean) 138.3 219.3 539.5 235.9 
# of stocks per institution-quarter (Median) 63.0 92.0 220.0 90.0 
% of outstanding shares (Mean) 1.16% 0.51% 0.52% 0.69% 
% of outstanding shares (Median) 0.36% 0.10% 0.06% 0.13% 
Confidential 13F Form Filings 
# of institutions 106 103 23 232 
# of 13F filings 870 627 57 1,554 
$ million per institution-quarter (Mean) 743.0 1,048.1 793.3 876.3 
   % to original and conf. holdings combined (Mean) 33.8% 20.6% 11.4% 27.3% 
$ million per institution-quarter (Median) 156.4 151.5 49.6 147.8 
   % to original and conf. holdings combined (Median) 23.7% 5.3% 0.2% 13.4% 
# of stocks per institution-quarter (Mean) 77.2 67.3 61.5 72.2 
   % to original and conf. holdings combined (Mean) 22.8% 13.2% 9.4% 18.3% 
# of stocks per institution-quarter (Median) 7.0 11.0 7.0 8.0 
   % to original and conf. holdings combined (Median) 12.0% 3.2% 0.3% 6.7% 
% of outstanding shares (Mean) 1.24% 1.29% 1.15% 1.25% 




Panel C: Top Ten Institutions Seeking Confidentiality and Top Ten Denied Institutions 
 
Top Ten Institutions Seeking 
Confidentiality Inst. Type # Conf. Filings % Rejected 
Chesapeake Partners Management Co. INVCO 112 6.3%
UBS Oconnor, L.L.C. HF 79 1.3%
T. Rowe Price Assoc Inc INVCO 70 5.7%
Berkshire Hathaway Inc INVCO 65 72.3%
Satellite Asset Management HF 64 9.4%
Lehman Brothers Inc. INVCO 49 0.0%
HBK Investments, L.P. HF 48 27.1%
Polygon Investment Partners HF 40 0.0%
M.H. Davidson & Company HF 39 0.0%
Stark Offshore Management, L.L.C. HF 38 2.6%
Total:  604 79
% of the full sample   38.9% 29.3%
    
    
Top Ten Institutions with Denied 
Confidential Requests Inst. Type # Conf. Filings % Rejected 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc INVCO 65 72.3%
D. E. Shaw & Co., Inc. HF 17 100.0%
Relational Investors, L.L.C. HF 24 62.5%
HBK Investments, L.P. HF 48 27.1%
Staro Asset Management, L.L.C. HF 25 52.0%
SAB Capital Advisors, L.L.C. HF 26 46.2%
Atlantic Investment Co INVCO 12 91.7%
RBS Partners, L.P. HF 31 29.0%
Caxton Corporation HF 9 100.0%
Two Sigma Investments, L.L.C. HF 10 80.0%
Total:  267 154






Determinants of 13F Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds 
This table reports the results of the determinants of 13F confidential filings of hedge funds.  The dependent 
variable of the probit model is an indicator variable for a filing to be confidential. The dependent variable of the tobit 
model is the dollar value of confidential holdings as a percentage of the total dollar value of holdings for an institution-
quarter. Reported are coefficient estimates, and their t-statistics (in parentheses) and associated average partial effects 
(APE, in percentage points). Log(Age) is natural logarithm of the number of years since the institution’s first appearance 
on Thomson Reuters. PortSize is the total equity portfolio size of an institution calculated as the market value of its 
quarter-end holdings.  Turnover is the inter-quarter portfolio turnover rate calculated as the lesser of purchases and sales 
divided by the average portfolio size of the last and the current quarter. PortHHI is the Herfindahl index of the portfolio, 
calculated from the market value of each component stock. PortRet and PortVol are the monthly average return and 
volatility on the portfolio during the quarter, assuming that the institution maintains the holdings of the last quarter-end. 
|Flow| is the absolute change in total portfolio value between two consecutive quarters net of the increase due to returns, 
expressed as a percentage of the portfolio size at the previous quarter-end. IdioVol is the idiosyncratic volatility computed 
from the residuals to the four factors (market, size, book-to-market, and momentum) using imputed monthly returns for 
the 36-month period ending in the current quarter. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
institution level. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Probit Regressions Tobit Regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Age) 0.001 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.004 
(0.06) (0.81) (0.90) (0.26) (0.08) (0.06) 
0.01% 0.12% 0.12% 0.06% 0.02% 0.01% 
Log(PortSize) 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.198*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 
(9.55) (10.82) (10.15) (3.54) (3.70) (3.70) 
1.30% 1.36% 1.34% 0.43% 0.45% 0.44% 
Turnover 1.837*** 1.859*** 1.861*** 1.575*** 1.587*** 1.589*** 
(15.30) (15.17) (15.29) (3.75) (3.82) (3.83) 
12.47% 12.60% 12.60% 5.34% 5.38% 5.38% 
PortHHI 3.175*** 2.937*** 2.912*** 2.603*** 2.409*** 2.396*** 
(14.64) (14.80) (14.84) (6.93) (6.36) (6.17) 
21.55% 19.91% 19.72% 8.82% 8.16% 8.12% 
PortRet 0.070 0.100 0.163 0.097 0.064 0.032 
(0.16) (0.24) (0.37) (0.18) (0.13) (0.06) 
0.48% 0.68% 1.10% 0.33% 0.22% 0.11% 
|Flow| 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.170*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 
(6.61) (6.42) (6.53) (4.11) (4.13) (4.14) 
1.33% 1.30% 1.31% 0.58% 0.57% 0.57% 
PortVol 0.759 1.402 0.861 0.802 
(0.98) (1.01) (0.75) (0.49) 
5.15% 9.50% 2.92% 2.72% 
IdioVol 4.846*** 6.696** 4.068* 5.123* 
(3.10) (2.40) (1.94) (1.73) 
32.85% 45.35% 13.79% 17.35% 
Constant 3.902*** 3.975*** 3.914*** 3.092*** 3.124*** 3.089*** 
(21.10) (24.24) (20.88) (9.76) (10.17) (9.73) 
Observations 12,845 12,845 12,845 12,845 12,845 12,845 
Pseudo R-square 0.106 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.112 0.113 




Stock Characteristics of the Original and Confidential 13F Holdings of Hedge Funds 
 Panel A compares the summary statistics of stocks in original and confidential 13F holdings of hedge funds. All variables, unless otherwise specified, are 
calculated at the fiscal year-end before the portfolio dates.  Size is the quarter-end market capitalization of the stock in millions of dollars. B/M is the firm’s book-
to-market ratio.  Adj. Past Return is the stock return during the twelve months prior to the quarter-end portfolio date adjusted by CRSP value-weighted market 
return. Illiquidity is the variant of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, computed as the yearly average of the square root of daily |Return|/(Price×Vol).  Analysts is 
the number of I/B/E/S analysts covering the firm during the year. (DTD < 1.64) is the dummy variable for the Merton (1974) distance-to-default measure to be 
smaller than 1.64 (implying a 5% or higher default probability). Volatility and Idio. Vol are total and idiosyncratic volatilities from the four-factor model using past 
36 monthly stock returns. M&A is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the stock of the firm that was an announced M&A target during the four-quarter 
period ending in the portfolio quarter. The standard errors of the two sample t-tests adjust for clustering at the stock and quarter levels. Panel B reports the results 
from logistic regressions modeling the determinants of 13F confidential holdings at the stock level.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable for a stock to 
be included in the confidential holdings of an institution-quarter. Each column reports estimated coefficients, their t-statistics (in parentheses), and the average 
partial effects (APE, in percentage points).  All standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the institution level.  Quarterly dummies and Fama-
French 10-industry dummies are included in all specifications in Panel B.  Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Stocks of Original and Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds 
  Size B/M Adj. Past Return Illiquidity Analysts DTD < 1.64 Volatility Idio. Vol M&A  
Confidential 13F Form Filings  
Mean  7,781.3  0.557 17.6% 0.094 14.31 21.4% 0.515 0.451 7.5% 
Median  1,374.5  0.463 5.7% 0.047 12.00 0 0.445 0.386 0 
Std. Dev. 23,959.4  0.411 60.9% 0.143 11.09 41.0% 0.265 0.243 26.4% 
Min       25.6  0.038 74.2% 0.003 1.00 0 0.137 0.110 0 
Max 244,686.7  2.258 291.8% 1.147 52.00 1 1.333 1.210 1 
# obs 38,126  38,126  38,126  37,999  38,069  38,126  38,068  38,068  38,126  
 
Original 13F Form Filings  
Mean 16,882.7  0.505 12.9% 0.089 16.26 14.5% 0.442 0.388 4.1% 
Median 2,477.4  0.411 2.7% 0.031 14.00 0 0.380 0.328 0 
Std. Dev. 39,989.8  0.388 55.2% 0.174 12.18 35.2% 0.238 0.221 19.9% 
Min       25.6  0.038 74.2% 0.003 1.00 0 0.137 0.110 0 
Max  244,686.7  2.258 291.8% 1.147 52.00 1 1.333 1.210 1 
# obs 1,723,003  1,722,978  1,723,003  1,717,361  1,720,719  1,723,003  1,720,629  1,720,629  1,723,003  
 
Two-sample Tests (Conf.- Original)  
Differences in Mean   9,101***   0.051***  4.7%  0.005   1.944***  0.069*** 0.073*** 0.062*** 3.4%*** 
Clustered t-stat. (7.29) (3.46) (1.63) (0.85) (4.86) (4.68) (5.36) (5.42) (3.33) 
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Panel B: Determinants of Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds – Stock Level 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
M&A 0.932*** 0.951*** 0.956*** 0.942*** 0.938*** 0.946*** 0.945*** 
(22.81) (20.22) (21.90) (20.19) (20.47) (22.63) (22.64) 
1.93% 1.97% 1.98% 1.95% 1.94% 1.95% 1.95% 
Log(Size) 0.148*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 
(26.39) (38.05) (37.22) 
0.31% -0.52% 0.52% 
Illiquidity -0.296*** -2.031*** 2.044*** 
(6.11) (26.77) (26.90) 
0.61% 4.19% 4.22% 
Log(Analysts) 0.110*** 0.020** 0.020** 
(9.84) (2.21) (2.14) 
0.23% 0.04% 0.04% 
Volatility 0.728*** 0.187*** 
(13.41) (3.96) 
1.51% 0.39% 
Idio. Vol. 0.833*** 0.195*** 
(14.12) (3.71) 
1.73% 0.40% 
DTD < 1.64 0.016 0.217*** 0.156*** 0.059** 0.074*** 0.012 0.007 
(0.80) (8.78) (6.80) (2.19) (2.83) (0.51) (0.32) 
0.03% 0.45% 0.32% 0.12% 0.15% 0.02% 0.01% 
B/M 0.185*** 0.083*** 0.024 0.009 0.010 0.114*** 0.114*** 
(8.32) (3.14) (1.01) (0.38) (0.41) (5.26) (5.26) 
0.38% 0.17% 0.05% 0.02% 0.02% 0.24% 0.24% 
Adj. Past Return 0.026** 0.051*** 0.007 0.013 0.001 0.128*** 0.126*** 
(2.39) (3.91) (0.59) (1.08) (0.06) (11.50) (11.32) 
0.05% 0.11% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.26% 0.26% 
Constant 3.784*** 5.020*** 4.777*** 5.293*** 5.282*** 2.827*** 2.828*** 
(44.24) (66.03) (60.69) (66.20) (66.47) (29.55) (29.34) 
Observations  1,761,104   1,755,335   1,758,763   1,758,672   1,758,672   1,755,335   1,755,335  
Unconditional Mean 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 







Trading during Confidential Periods 
 
This table reports the trades of confidential holdings by hedge funds seeking confidential treatment within the confidential periods, and compares them with the 
trades of original holdings by the same funds in the same periods. The initial position of confidential holdings is the position for which confidential treatment is 
sought, scaled by number of shares outstanding. The initial positions of original holdings are the contemporaneous positions of the same fund in original holdings. 
The total trade volume is the sum of absolute values of quarter-to-quarter position changes in the confidential or contemporaneous original stocks within the 
confidential period. Increase from initial to maximum (max) position is the difference between the maximum position and the initial position of the fund in the 
confidential stock or contemporaneous original stocks. Summary statistics for initial position, total trade volume, and increase from initial to max position are 
reported after scaling each of these variables by (a) the number of shares outstanding, and (b) the initial position. Time to max position is the number of quarters 
between the initial position and the maximum position within the confidential period. The last two rows of the table reports the differences between each of the 
variables (initial position, total trade volume, and increase from initial to max position, and time to max position) for confidential and original holdings and the 
two-sample mean difference t-statistics are reported in parentheses below. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
 
Variable   Initial Position Total Trade Volume  Maximum - Initial Total Trade Volume  Maximum - Initial Time to Maximum 
% of Shares Outstanding Multiple of initial position Quarters 
Confidential Holdings 
Mean 0.30% 0.96% 0.25% 14.77 6.55 2.58 
Median 0.11% 0.50% 0.05% 3.00 0.51 1.00 
Std. Dev. 0.57% 1.23% 0.45% 33.65 18.49 3.16 
Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 4.88% 5.86% 2.25% 193.01 114.94 11.00 
N 37,204 37,204 37,204 37,204 37,204 37,204 
Original Holdings 
Mean 0.28% 0.34% 0.09% 5.55 3.03 0.93 
Median 0.05% 0.07% 0.00% 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.74% 0.80% 0.29% 20.34 12.74 1.24 
Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 4.88% 5.86% 2.25% 193.01 114.94 9.00 
N 97,723 97,723 97,723 97,717 97,717 97,723 
Two-sample Tests 
Difference in Mean 
(Conf. - Original) 0.02% 0.62%*** 0.16%*** 9.22** 3.52* 1.66*** 





Abnormal Returns:  Comparison of Original and Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds 
Panel A reports the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha and the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (DGTW) 
benchmark-adjusted returns for both original and confidential 13F holdings of hedge funds, and the differences between 
the two types. Confidential filings are grouped by the length of their confidential periods and evaluated for their abnormal 
performance at seven horizons from two months up to one year. The paired original holdings are by the same institutions 
and during the same period. The four-factor alpha (in basis points daily) is computed from the daily value-weighted 
portfolio returns.  The DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns are first computed for each stock and then are averaged at the 
portfolio level using value weights of the portfolio.  Both abnormal return measures are first calculated for each original 
or confidential 13F filing, and then averaged at the institution-level.  Panel B follows the Griffin and Xu (2009) approach 
by reporting the raw returns and DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns evaluated three months after the portfolio holding 
quarter-end for original and confidential 13F holdings of hedge funds, and the differences between he two. Return 
measures are first calculated for each institution-quarter portfolio using value or equal weights of the portfolio holdings 
and then averaged across the institution-quarter portfolios in the sample period. Both raw and DGTW benchmark-adjusted 
returns are annualized. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings  
  Return Horizons 
  2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Daily Four-factor Alphas 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 5.39 5.04 4.36 3.74 4.32 3.7 4.5 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 2.82 2.72 2.77 2.54 2.45 2.38 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) 2.57*** 2.31** 1.59** 1.21 1.88*** 1.31* 2.05*** 
Annualized Diff. 6.48%*** 5.83%** 4.01%** 3.04% 4.73%*** 3.31%* 5.17%***
t-stat. 3.02 2.22 2.05 1.04 2.68 1.72 3.11 
# of Conf. Filings 81 35 144 24 162 112 309 
# of Original Filings 14,000 14,000 13,997 13,992 13,990 13,986 13,976 
DGTW Benchmark-adjusted Returns 
Conf. Holdings 5.48% 1.97% 0.89% 3.86% 2.64% 4.86% 8.08% 
Original Holdings 0.22% 0.26% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.29% 0.57% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 5.26%*** 1.71%** 0.74% 3.67%** 2.47%** 4.57%*** 7.51%***
Annualized Diff. 31.56%*** 6.83%** 2.22% 8.80%** 4.94%** 6.09%*** 7.51%***
t-stat. 6.78 2.39 0.93 2.56 2.46 2.83 4.27 
# of Conf. Filings 78 34 142 19 165 102 331 
# of Original Filings 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 
 
Panel B:  Comparison to Griffin and Xu (2009)  
  # of 13F Filings  Raw Returns  
DGTW benchmark-adjusted 
Returns 
  Conf. Orig.  Conf. Orig. Diff.  Conf. Orig. Diff. 
 
Value-Weighted Returns  
1999-2007 870 14,002 19.97% 13.00% 6.98%*** 6.37% 1.39% 4.99%*** 
t-stat. 6.88 31.18 2.65 3.13 5.48 2.63 
 
Equal-Weighted Returns 
1999-2007 870 14,002 22.09% 14.36% 7.73%*** 5.52% 2.02% 3.50%* 





Abnormal Returns of Acquisition- and Disposition-Motivated Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds 
 
This table repeats the analyses in Table V, except separately for acquisition- and disposition-motivated confidential 
holdings.  Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 
Panel A: Daily four-factor alphas 
  Return Horizons 
  2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Acquisition Sample 
Conf. Holdings (basis points) 5.57 5.34 2.75 5.38 4.44 3.88 3.98 
Original Holdings (basis points) 2.80 2.70 2.75 2.51 2.43 2.37 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig. (basis points) 2.77** 2.64** 0.00 2.87** 2.01*** 1.52* 1.54** 
Annualized Diff. 6.97%** 6.66%** 0.003% 7.23%** 5.06%*** 3.82%* 3.88%**
t-stat. 2.13 2.32 0.00 2.55 2.58 1.86 2.25 
# of Conf. Filings 59 47 115 34 141 101 288 
# of Original Filings 14,000 14,000 13,997 13,992 13,990 13,986 13,976 
Disposition Sample 
Conf. Holdings (basis points) 3.21 4.74 6.05 2.92 1.85 -0.52 2.95 
Original Holdings (basis points) 2.80 2.70 2.75 2.51 2.43 2.37 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig. (basis points) 0.41 2.04 3.30*** 0.41 0.58 2.88*** 0.51 
Annualized Diff. 1.03% 5.14% 8.32%*** 1.04% 1.47% 7.27%*** 1.29% 
t-stat. 0.40 1.56 3.39 0.23 0.58 3.05 0.57 
# of Conf. Filings 49 29 55 12 51 40 155 
# of Original Filings 14,000 14,000 13,997 13,992 13,990 13,986 13,976 
 
Panel B:  DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns 
  Return Horizons 
  2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Acquisition Sample 
Conf. Holdings 4.64% 1.56% 0.63% 4.15% 2.22% 4.61% 7.63% 
Original Holdings 0.22% 0.26% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.29% 0.57% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 4.42%*** 1.29%* 0.78% 3.96%*** 2.06%** 4.32%*** 7.06%***
Annualized Diff. 26.53%*** 5.18%* 2.33% 9.51%*** 4.11%** 5.76%*** 7.06%***
t-stat. 6.12 1.81 -0.97 2.76 2.05 2.63 3.95 
# of Conf. Filings 59 29 131 19 149 97 307 
# of Original Filings 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Disposition Sample 
Conf. Holdings 5.24% 1.07% 5.92% 5.69% 0.94% 4.21% 3.51% 
Original Holdings 0.22% 0.26% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.29% 0.57% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 5.02%*** 0.80% 5.77%*** 5.50% 0.77% 4.50%** 2.94% 
Annualized Diff. 30.15%*** 3.22% 17.32%*** 13.20% 1.55% 6.00%** 2.94% 
t-stat. 6.13 0.74 5.85 0.58 0.60 -2.40 1.42 
# of Conf. Filings 40 13 57 6 65 34 190 
# of Original Filings 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 
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Table VII  
Determinants of Denials of Confidential Filings 
 
This table estimates the denial decisions of the SEC on applications for confidential treatment using the probit model. The 
sample includes all confidential filings by hedge funds. # Past CF is the number of past confidential filings by the same 
institution. % Past Denied is the percent of past confidential filings denied by the SEC. % Conf. Stocks is the number of 
distinct stocks contained in the confidential filing as a percentage of the total portfolio. Value CF is the market value of 
confidential holdings in the given filing. % Value CF is the market value of confidential holdings as percentage of value 
of total portfolio. Avg. Conf. Position is the average number of shares of confidential holdings as a percentage of shares 
outstanding.  The fund characteristics are as defined in Table II.  All standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the institution level. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Confidential Filing Characteristics    
Log(# Past CF) 0.085 0.133 0.115 0.140 0.068 0.042 0.060 
(0.83) (1.49) (1.21) (1.62) (0.67) (0.40) (0.50) 
% Past Denied 3.158*** 3.201*** 3.187*** 3.189*** 3.109*** 3.278*** 3.677*** 
(14.09) (14.48) (14.16) (11.98) (14.05) (12.50) (9.37) 
% Conf. Stocks 0.513**  1.405*** 0.735*** 1.062** 
(2.24)  (3.14) (3.16) (2.34) 
Avg. Conf. Position 12.482*** 14.929*** 16.120*** 10.082** 
(2.81) (3.17) (3.95) (2.07) 
% Value CF  0.247 0.853** 1.289** 
 (1.18) (2.18) (2.44) 
Log(Value CF)  0.001 0.062* 
 (0.03) (1.70) 
Fund Characteristics  
Log(Age)  0.058 
 (0.41) 
Log(PortSize)  0.144** 
 (1.96) 
Turnover  1.279* 
 (1.86) 
PortHHI  0.567 
 (0.74) 
PortRet  1.660 
 (0.77) 
|Flow|  0.095 
 (1.30) 
IdioVol  4.867 
 (1.01) 
Constant 1.568*** 1.489*** 1.441*** 1.325** 1.772*** 1.772*** 0.433 
(6.54) (8.28) (6.78) (2.31) (7.57) (7.57) (0.85) 
 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 629 
Unconditional Mean 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 19.4% 





Market Reactions to the Disclosure of the Confidential 13F Filing by Hedge Funds  
 
This table reports the market reactions to the disclosure of the confidential 13F filing by hedge funds. We report the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with the disclosure of the quickly-denied confidential filings that are 
disclosed within 45-180 days after the quarter-end portfolio date, and disclosure of the non-denial cases of confidential 
filings with similar delay in disclosure. Each confidential filing is treated as one event with equal weights assigned to the 
stock positions included in the filing. Abnormal returns are estimated from the market model using the equally-weighted 
CRSP market index over the period from 300 to 91 days prior to the event date. Betas are estimated using Scholes and 
Willams (1977) approach to account for non-synchronous trading. CARs are reported over the (1, +1), (2, +2), and (5, 
+5) windows around the event date. The z-statistics from the Patell test (with two tails) to test if the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns are statistically different from zero are provided in the parentheses below the mean CARs. % positive 
represents the proportion of portfolios that have positive abnormal returns and the z-statistics from the generalized sign 
test (with two tails) to test their statistical significance are reported below in parentheses. Num is the number of events, 
i.e., confidential filings. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
  Quickly-denied Confidential Filings   Non-denied Confidential Filings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Windows Num Mean CAR (%) % Positive Num Mean CAR (%) % Positive 
(-1,+1)        66 0.54%** 63.6%** 197 0.39% 52.3% 
(2.42) (2.34) 1.45 0.926 
(-2,+2)        66 0.97%*** 63.6%** 197 0.30% 53.8% 
(2.61) (2.09) 1.25 1.353 
(-5,+5)        66 1.19%** 62.1%*** 197 0.52% 52.8% 





Internet Appendix for  
“Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide” 
 
This Internet Appendix consists of two parts. Part I provides a model where confidential treatment is 
allowed as a relief from mandatory portfolio disclosure. Part II tabulates the additional results for 
sensitivity analyses and robustness checks for some of the empirical tests that we conduct in the 
published paper.  
 
Part I.  A Model of Portfolio Disclosure and Confidential Treatment 
 
A.  Overview       
Several theoretical papers analyze how informed traders behave under mandatory disclosure 
(Fishman and Hagerty (1995), John and Narayanan (1997), Huddart, Hughes, and Brunnermeier (1999), 
Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001), and George and Hwang (2007)). Of these, Huddart, Hughes, and 
Levine (2001, henceforth HHL) provide perhaps the most relevant theoretical framework for studying 
the confidential treatment of portfolio disclosure through amendments to Form 13F. HHL build on Kyle 
(1985) model by introducing mandatory disclosure by an informed trader without imposing limitation on 
trade size. HHL show that under mandatory disclosure, the informed trader’s profits are lower and the 
price discovery faster, compared to the no disclosure case in Kyle model. The authors prove the 
existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the informed trader adds a random noise to a linear 
strategy in each period in order to avoid full retrieval of the private information by the market maker. 
Such a “dissimulation” strategy minimizes the loss in profits due to mandatory disclosure.  
We consider a modified version of the HHL model to analyze confidential treatment, or relief 
from mandatory disclosure of Form 13F. The 13F regulation requires the informed trader to disclose his 
position at the end of each quarter, which reveals information about his trades as in HHL. However, if 
the informed trader obtains confidential treatment over a certain period (typically up to one year), then 
he does not disclose his position over that period, as in the Kyle (1985) model. The informed trader’s 
decision to seek confidentiality will then depend on the tradeoff between the benefit of increased profits 
                                                        
 Citation format: Agarwal, Vikas, Wei Jiang, Yuehua Tang, and Baozhong Yang, Internet Appendix to “Uncovering hedge 
fund skill from the portfolio holdings they hide” Journal of Finance, http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp. Please note: 
Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. 
Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the article. 
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under confidentiality and the cost of seeking confidentiality.  
Our model fits the main institutional features of confidential treatment but is highly stylized with 
two major simplifications. First, like models in HHL and other related papers, ours analyzes the 
disclosure of trades rather than that of positions which is the subject of our empirical tests.  For the 
purpose of theoretical motivation, we assume that the main concern to hedge funds of disclosing quarter-
end positions is the revelation of trades.  In reality, the disclosure of quarter-end positions only reveals 
inter-quarter, but not intra-quarter, trades.  However, the intuition of our model goes through when the 
revelation of trades is incomplete from quarter-end disclosure.  Second, the model does not incorporate 
the possibility that other speculators may front-run the informed trader and thus reduce the latter’s 
expected profits even further (Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Madrigal (1996)). To the extent that 
confidentiality reduces front-running, the benefits of confidentiality in reality may be greater than what 
is considered in this model. 
 
B.  Model 
Following Kyle (1985), there is a risky security and a risk-free security with zero risk-free rate in 
the market.  In each of the N periods, 1,2 ,,n N  , traders submit orders, and a market maker sets the 
price.  There are two types of traders. One informed trader learns of the true value v of the risky security 
at the beginning of period 1 and strategically submits order nx in period n  to maximize his expected 
profits. The noise traders’ trade in any period n  is normally distributed, 2~ (0, )n uu N  . The market 
maker knows the prior distribution 0~ (0 ),v N  . The random variables 1 2, ,, , Nuv u u  are mutually 
independent. All agents are risk-neutral. Finally, the market maker observes the total order flow 
n n ny x u   but not its decomposition in period n.  The market maker sets the price so that he makes 
zero expected profits.  
The set up of mandatory disclosure follows HHL:  in every period 1 Nn  , the informed  
trader is required to disclose his trade nx to the regulator after trading occurs. The regulator disseminates 
such information to all market participants instantly.  We introduce confidential treatment by allowing 
the informed trader to seek relief from disclosing his trades. The trader incurs an exogenous cost 0CTc   
to apply for confidential treatment from period 1 to period 1dn   which, if granted, relieves him from the 
requirement of mandatory disclosure during these periods.  The parameter CTc can represent the direct 
cost of providing the required justification to the regulatory body as well as the indirect reputation cost 
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(i.e., denial of an inadequately motivated application increases the chance of denial of future 
applications1).  
The informed trader’s decision to seek confidentiality thus depends on the impact of confidential 
treatment on his expected profits. Let 
dn
 denote the total expected profits of the informed trader if 
confidentiality applies till period 1dn   and then mandatory disclosure follows in every period thereafter 
to period N .  Let 1  be the total expected profit of the informed trader in the absence of confidential 
treatment, that is, when disclosure occurs in every period (as in HHL).  Finally, let Pr be the probability 
that the confidentiality application gets approved.  The informed trader chooses to apply for confidential 
treatment if and only if 
 1 /d CTn Prc    (1) 
For simplicity we assume that Pr, the probability of obtaining approval, is independent of the potential 
benefits of confidentiality to the trader.2  Then the probability-adjusted cost /CTc Pr  is exogenous.   
Suppose confidentiality applies to periods 1, , 1dn   after which normal disclosure resumes.  
Let np denote the stock price that the market maker sets based on the total order flow in period n, and 
*
np  be the stock price that the market maker updates to at the end of the period if the trade by the 
informed trader (xn) during the period is disclosed.  During the periods when confidentiality applies, np
remains to the end of the period.   
Using the standard technique from Kyle (1985), we will show that a unique equilibrium exists in 
which the informed trader’s strategy is of the following form 
 1
1
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     

 (2) 
where 2~ (0, )
nn z
Nz  is normally distributed and independent of v  and 1{ }t t Nu   . Intuitively, (2) 
indicates that the informed trader adopts a linear strategy during the non-disclosure periods (as in Kyle 
(1985)) but adds a normal disturbance during the disclosure periods (as in HHL). The linear coefficient 
n measures how aggressively he trades on his private information in each period, and the noise 
                                                        
1 This relation is supported by our empirical tests in Section V.A of the published paper. 
2 This assumption is supported by our empirical finding that the likelihood of denial is not systematically correlated with fund 
characteristics (Table VII in the published paper), and that confidential holdings in denied filings exhibit similar magnitude 





 represents the level of dissimulation employed to mask private information in the disclosed 
trade.  
The market maker’s optimal response to the informed trader’s strategy (2) is to set the trading 
price np as a linear function of the total order flow, 
 * 1 ( ),n n n n np x up     (3) 
The linear coefficient n represents the impact of order flow on price, or the market depth.  If the 
informed trader’s action is disclosed at the end of the period, the market maker updates the price based 
on the following linear rule 
 * 1 ,n n n npp x    (4) 
The linear coefficient n  captures how responsive the market price is to the disclosure of trade 
information. 
 Let n  denote the informed trader’s profits on positions in period n , and n  denote his total 
profits over the periods , 1, ,n n N  . In other words, 
 ( ) , ( )
N N




nv p x v p x  
 
       (5) 
 In equilibrium, the informed trader chooses a trading strategy to maximize his expected profits
* *
1 1, ,| , ][ n npp vE    at the beginning of every period n. The conditional variance 
* *
1 1( | , , )n nVar v p p     represents the extent of the remaining private information of the informed 
trader, after 1n   rounds of trades.  
 
The following Proposition characterizes the strategies and expected profits of the informed trader, 
and the pricing rules by the market maker. In the proof of the proposition, we also show that this is the 
unique equilibrium when strategies are constrained to be of the linear forms as in (2) − (4). 
 
Proposition:  Assume that the informed trader discloses per-period trade starting from period dn with 
1 dn N  . Then 
(i)  There are constants n , n , n , n , n  , n  , 2nz , such that the strategies satisfy (2) – (4), and the 
informed trader’s expected profits are given by 
 * * 21 1 1 1 1, , ,[ | ,  for 1] ( )  .n n n n np v vE p n Np            (6) 
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Given 0  and 2u , the constants  n , n , n , n , n , and 2nz solve the following recursive equation 
system: 
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 (10) 
where the constants  for , 1 1n n n dn n      . 
(ii) The sequence of constants 1{ } dn n n    that appear in the recursive formulas (8) – (10) do not depend 
on 0  and u , and are uniquely determined by the following equations: 
 1 / 2, 10 n dn n     (11) 
 3 2( ( 1)(8 2 0,  if ) 11)n n d n dN n n n          (12) 
 3 21)( ) 2 1 0,  i8(1 2 f 1 n n n n dn n           (13) 
(iii) The expected profits of the informed trader in period n is given by 
 2[ ,]  for 1n n uE n N      (14) 








       . 
(iv) The benefit of confidentiality, or the incremental profit from confidentiality, 1dn  , is increasing 
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in the extent of asymmetric information, 0 . 
 
 Proof of the Proposition appears in Section C of this document.  The solution given in the above 
proposition is reducible to the Kyle (1985) model ( dn N ) or the HHL model ( 1dn  ) as special cases. 
Part (i) gives the recursive formulas for the strategy parameters.  Part (ii) directly computes the series of 
key constants n  (used in the recursive formulas) through backward induction, starting with 1dn n  .  
Part (iii) shows that the informed trader’s profits are always proportional to the noise trader volume ( 2u ) 
by the market depth parameter ( n ), regardless of the disclosure regime. Market depth, however, is 
endogenously determined in equilibrium by the market maker’s pricing rule given the informed trader’s 
trading strategy.   
Of most direct relevance to our empirical tests is the prediction in part (iv) of the Proposition 
which posits that the informed trader can benefit more from confidentiality when he commands more ex 
ante information advantage (higher 0 ), which is also a direct measure of information asymmetry.  
Given the exogenous cost of seeking confidentiality, the Proposition predicts that the informed trader 
(e.g., a hedge fund manager) is more likely to seek confidentiality on a position when there is greater 
asymmetric information about the value of the stock.   
 
C.  Proof of the Proposition 
Part (i): We proceed by proving (a) – (d) sequentially.  
Case (a): Because the informed trader discloses in periods 1, , ,d dn n N  , the model in the last 
1dN n   periods maps exactly to the HHL model with prior variance 1dn  . Thus, the solution of HHL 
(their Proposition 4) applies, with the total number of periods replaced by 1dN n  , and the prior 
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(15) and (16) complete the proof of (7) in case (a). 
Case (b): Since there is no disclosure in period 1dn n  , Theorem 2 of Kyle (1985) applies.3 
Therefore, (6) holds and 
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(16) implies that 
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(17) and (18) complete the proof of (8) in case (b). 
 
 Case (c): When 1dn n  , the recursive equations (Theorem 2) in Kyle (1985) apply in both 
period n  and period 1n . Therefore,  
 1 12
1 21 , , (1 ) , .
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n n u n n
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(19) and (20) complete the proof of (9) in case (c). 
 Case (d): If 1dn  , then (19) implies that  
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3 This case is not exactly the same as the Kyle (1985) model because the informed trader discloses trades in the next period 
n+1 and thereafter.  For the argument of Kyle (1985) to apply to period n, we only need that the future expected profits (from 






Part (ii):  The proof of this part will need the following lemma. 
 
Lemma. Suppose 0K  , then there is a unique solution (0,1)  to the following equation 
 3 28 (2 1) 0.8 K       (21) 
Furthermore, 0 1/ 2  . 





f   

 is 
increasing for (0,1/ 2) . Because ( )f   approaches 0 as 0  , and   as 12
 , there is a 
unique (0,1/ 2)  such that ( )f K  , i.e., (21) is satisfied.  Because )( 0f    for (1/ 2,1) , the 
above solution is also the unique solution in the interval (0,1) . Q.E.D. 
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Equations (17) and (22) imply that  
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    (25) 
plugging (25) into (24), and reorganizing terms, we obtain equation (12) that determines 1dn  . Note that 
the second order condition (1 ) 0n n n     in Theorem 2 of Kyle (1985) implies that 10 1dn   . It 
68 
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 (26) 
From  (26) we obtain 
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   from (26) into (27) and 
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 (28) 











   (29) 
After substituting (29) into (28) and using some simple algebra, we obtain equation (13) that determines 
n  given 1n   (replicated here): 
 3 21)( ) 2 18(1 2 0.n n n n         (30) 




   , there is a unique root n  of (30) in (0, 12 ). Now it follows by induction that 
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Part (iv): Since n  is proportional to 0
u









   is proportional to 
0 u , and so is the total profit function in the full-disclosure case 1 . Therefore, the benefit of 
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Part II.  Additional Tables for Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Checks 
 
Table IA.I:      Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds:  Alternative 
Hedge Fund List 
 
Table IA.II:    Abnormal Returns of Acquisition- and Disposition-Motivated Confidential Holdings: 
Forward-Looking Classification 
 
Table IA.III:   Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings without accompanying option 
positions 
 
Table IA.IV:   Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings of Investment Companies or 
Advisors 
 
Table IA.V:    Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds excluding 





Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds:  
Alternative Hedge Fund List 
  
This table repeats the analyses in panel A of Table V in the published paper except using an alternative list of 
hedge funds using the Form ADV information as described in Section II.A. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and 
* are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Return Horizons 
   2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Daily Four-factor Alphas 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 6.16 4.50 4.29 4.23 4.10 3.76 4.27 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 3.00 2.82 2.83 2.60 2.45 2.34 2.43 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) 3.16*** 1.68 1.46* 1.63 1.65** 1.42* 1.85** 
Annualized Diff. 7.96%*** 4.23% 3.67%* 4.10% 4.15%** 3.57%* 4.65%** 
t-Stat. 3.45 1.43 1.77 1.38 2.27 1.76 2.54 
# of Conf. Filings 73 29 118 23 136 89 262 
# of Original Filings 10,434 10,434 10,431 10,428 10,426 10,423 10,417 
DGTW Benchmark-adjusted Returns  
Conf. Holdings 6.15% 0.03% 0.74% 1.59% 2.06% 6.69% 8.63% 
Original Holdings 0.24% 0.27% 0.15% 0.21% 0.16% 0.26% 0.59% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 5.91%*** -0.24% 0.59% 1.38% 1.90%* 6.43%*** 8.04%*** 
Annualized Diff. 35.46%*** -0.98% 1.76% 3.31% 3.79%* 8.58%*** 8.04%*** 
t-Stat. 6.60 -0.29 0.64 0.90 1.78 3.63 4.04 
# of Conf. Filings 71 28 116 18 138 83 277 







Abnormal Returns of Acquisition- and Disposition-Motivated Confidential Holdings:  
Forward-Looking Classification 
 
This table repeats the analyses of Table VI in the published paper except classifying acquisition- and disposition-
motivated confidential holdings based on a forward-looking algorithm. For each stock in a confidential filing, we 
compare the position (adjusted for stock splits) at the current quarter-end (t) to that of the same stock by the same 
institution at the following quarter-end (t+1), and classify net increase (decrease) as acquisition (disposition). 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Daily four-factor alphas 
 
  Return Horizons 
  2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Acquisition Sample 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 9.03 7.46 4.38 9.93 3.32 4.10 4.05 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 2.80 2.70 2.75 2.51 2.43 2.37 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) 6.23*** 4.76*** 1.63** 7.42*** 0.89 1.73** 1.61** 
Annualized Diff. 15.69%*** 11.98%*** 4.11%** 18.69%*** 2.24% 4.35%** 4.05%** 
t-Stat. 6.94 4.66 1.99 6.90 1.19 2.17 2.27 
# of Conf. Filings 49 51 103 30 97 72 215 
# of Original Filings 14,000 14,000 13,997 13,992 13,990 13,986 13,976 
Disposition Sample 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 2.28 0.09 3.94 3.24 3.16 3.17 3.34 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 2.80 2.70 2.75 2.51 2.43 2.37 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) -0.52 -2.62** 1.19 0.73 0.73 0.80 0.90 
Annualized Diff. -1.31% -6.59%** 2.99% 1.84% 1.84% 2.00% 2.28% 
t-Stat. -0.57 -2.37 1.47 0.61 0.98 1.00 1.35 
# of Conf. Filings 58 32 92 23 122 91 258 





Panel B:  DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns 
 
  Return Horizons 
  2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Acquisition Sample 
Conf. Holdings 9.23% 3.69% 0.29% 8.66% 3.61% 10.96% 5.00% 
Original Holdings 0.22% 0.26% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.29% 0.57% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 9.01%*** 3.43%*** 0.14% 8.47%*** 3.44%*** 10.6%*** 4.43%** 
Annualized Diff. 54.07%*** 13.71%*** 0.42% 20.33%*** 6.88%*** 14.22%*** 4.43%** 
t-Stat. 10.49 4.33 0.17 5.73 2.96 5.64 2.47 
# of Conf. Filings 46 24 111 15 105 67 251 
# of Original Filings 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Disposition Sample 
Conf. Holdings 1.34% -2.42% 2.06% -8.43% 1.37% -4.98% 3.95% 
Original Holdings 0.22% 0.26% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.29% 0.57% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 1.12%* -2.68%*** 1.91%** -8.62%*** 1.20% -5.27%*** 3.38%* 
Annualized Diff. 6.73%* -10.71%*** 5.74%** -20.69%*** 2.40% -7.03%*** 3.38%* 
t-Stat. 1.76 -3.05 2.32 -5.37 1.16 -3.33 1.88 
# of Conf. Filings 57 21 93 12 131 79 291 






Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings without accompanying option positions 
  
This table repeats the analyses of panel A of Table V in the published paper except excluding the stocks positions 
accompanied with call/put option positions in the original and confidential holdings. Coefficients marked with ***, 
**, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  Return Horizons 
   2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Daily Four-factor Alphas 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 5.29 4.72 3.79 1.91 4.00 3.73 4.08 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 2.82 2.72 2.77 2.54 2.45 2.38 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) 2.48*** 2.00* 1.03 -0.62 1.55** 1.35* 1.64** 
Annualized Diff. 6.24%*** 5.03%* 2.59% -1.57% 3.91%** 3.40%* 4.13%** 
t-Stat. 2.89 1.95 1.32 -0.51 2.19 1.78 2.46 
# of Conf. Filings 81 34 143 22 160 112 301 
# of Original Filings 14,000 14,000 13,997 13,992 13,990 13,986 13,976 
DGTW Benchmark-adjusted Returns 
Conf. Holdings 4.98% 1.05% 0.64% -0.55% 2.36% 4.28% 7.58% 
Original Holdings 0.22% 0.26% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.29% 0.57% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 4.76%*** 0.79% 0.50% -0.74% 2.19%** 4.00%** 7.01%*** 
Annualized Diff. 28.58%*** 3.14% 1.49% -1.77% 4.39%** 5.33%** 7.01%*** 
t-Stat. 6.09 1.06 0.62 -0.51 2.16 2.45 3.97 
# of Conf. Filings 78 34 142 17 163 102 325 







Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings of Investment Companies or Advisors 
  
This table repeats the analyses of panel A of Table V in the published paper except focusing on the confidential 
and original holdings of investment companies or advisors.  Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
  Return Horizons 
   2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Daily Four-factor Alphas 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 2.89 1.04 2.29 3.40 5.23 2.37 3.81 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 2.47 2.54 2.80 2.71 2.55 2.68 2.72 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) 0.42 -1.50 -0.50 0.69 2.68*** -0.31 1.09 
Annualized Diff. 1.06% -3.77% -1.27% 1.75% 6.75%*** -0.79% 2.74% 
t-Stat. 0.58 -1.50 -0.62 0.76 3.29 -0.38 1.59 
# of Conf. Filings 93 22 105 22 110 67 209 
# of Original Filings 31,953  31,952  31,951  31,949  31,946  31,945  31,935  
DGTW Benchmark-adjusted Returns 
Conf. Holdings 2.11% 0.63% -1.02% 2.83% 1.50% 2.75% 1.83% 
Original Holdings 0.07% 0.06% 0.14% 0.09% 0.12% 0.18% 0.34% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 2.04%** 0.57% -1.15% 2.73%* 1.38% 2.57% 1.49% 
Annualized Diff. 12.23%** 2.27% -3.46% 6.56%* 2.76% 3.42% 1.49% 
t-Stat. 2.56 0.64 -1.23 1.92 0.99 1.29 0.70 
# of Conf. Filings 94 24 104 21 107 65 217 








Abnormal Returns of Original and Confidential Holdings of Hedge Funds excluding Caxton and 
D.E. Shaw 
 
This table repeats the analyses of panel A of Table V in the published paper except excluding Caxton Corporation 
and D.E. Shaw & Co. Inc. from the sample of hedge funds.  Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant 




  Return Horizons 
   2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 9m 12m 
Daily Four-factor Alphas 
Conf. Holdings (in basis points) 5.39 5.04 4.36 3.75 4.38 3.74 4.57 
Original Holdings (in basis points) 2.82 2.73 2.77 2.54 2.45 2.38 2.44 
Diff: Conf. - Orig.  (in basis points) 2.57*** 2.31** 1.59** 1.21 1.93*** 1.36* 2.13*** 
Annualized Diff. 6.48%*** 5.83%** 4.01%** 3.04% 4.86%*** 3.42%* 5.36%*** 
t-Stat. 3.02 2.22 2.05 1.04 2.72 1.75 3.17 
# of Conf. Filings 80 35 143 23 160 110 290 
# of Original Filings 13,952 13,952 13,950 13,945 13,943 13,940 13,930 
DGTW Benchmark-adjusted Returns 
Conf. Holdings 5.55% 2.19% 0.89% 4.07% 2.75% 5.13% 8.41% 
Original Holdings 0.21% 0.26% 0.14% 0.18% 0.15% 0.27% 0.56% 
Diff: Conf. - Original 5.34%*** 1.93%*** 0.75% 3.89%*** 2.60%** 4.86%*** 7.85%*** 
Annualized Diff. 32.04%*** 7.73%*** 2.24% 9.34%*** 5.19%** 6.48%*** 7.85%*** 
t-Stat. 6.82 2.64 0.94 2.64 2.53 2.91 4.34 
# of Conf. Filings 77 33 142 18 162 100 312 
# of Original Filings 13,930 13,930 13,930 13,930 13,930 13,930 13,930 
 
 
 
 
